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CHAPTER 1: 
THE SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY (SADC) AND ITS 
PURSUIT OF ECONOMIC INTEGRATION THROUGH CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE 
 
1.1 Background 
 
It has been submitted that an increasingly integrated and globalised economy 
demands appropriate and effective governance policies with a view to sustainability 
and well-governed wealth creation.1 There is a growing consensus that good corporate 
governance policies improve the sustainability of companies by, among other things, 
increasing access to capital via investment.2 The Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) promotes a similar argument by asserting that 
good corporate governance policies enhance, inter alia, investor confidence.3 
 
On a separate (and seemingly unrelated) note, it has further been submitted that, in  
conjunction with facilitating economic growth and integration in the region, attracting 
investment has been placed at the core of the development agenda for the Southern 
African Development Community (SADC).4 However, it has been argued that SADC 
has failed in respect of this stated aim, in that it has not made the desired progress in 
its above-mentioned objectives, particularly facilitating economic growth and 
integration in the region.5 
 
In light of the above, it is submitted that SADC is in need of some form of assistance 
in the pursuit of its goals, and the establishment of a uniform corporate governance 
regime is potentially a catalyst for the achievement thereof. Briefly put, if SADC 
governments want to successfully attract private partners, they need to win the trust 
and confidence of investors.6 It has been found that the vast majority of international 
                                                          
1Corrigan T Getting Down to Business: Lessons from the African Peer Review Mechanism (2014) 31.  
2Wiese T ‘Corporate Governance in South Africa: With International Comparisons’ (2014) 5.  
3Wiese T ‘Corporate Governance in South Africa: With International Comparisons’ (2014) 6.  
4OECD-SADC Policy Brief June 2015 available at http://www.oecd.org/dat/inv(accessed 25th 
September 2016). 
5Saurombe A ‘The Role of SADC Institutions in Implementing SADC Treaty Provisions Dealing with 
Regional Integration’ (2012) 15 2 PER/PELJ 454 475.  
6OECD-SADC Policy Brief June 2015 available at http://www.oecd.org/dat/inv(accessed 25th 
September 2016). 
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investors are prepared to pay a premium for shares in well-governed companies and 
that the board practices of potential investor recipient companies are considered as 
important as financial performance.7 
 
This paper will delve into what constitutes corporate governance in greater detail in 
the ensuing chapters, though it is useful to illustrate it here briefly, for the purposes of 
an introduction. Broadly speaking, corporate governance is described as the system 
of regulating and overseeing corporate conduct and of balancing the interests of all 
internal stakeholders and other parties who can be affected by the corporation’s 
conduct, in order to ensure responsible behaviour by corporations and to achieve the 
maximum level of efficiency and profitability for a corporation.8 
 
 
1.2 Purpose and Methodology 
 
This paper will interrogate the idea of devising and implementing a uniform corporate 
governance system amongst SADC member states, in order to attract investment and, 
as a desirable side-effect, to assist in the economic integration of the region.  
 
In particular, this paper will be guided by questions surrounding specific aspects of this 
topic, including what the current corporate governance landscape in the SADC region 
is, and whether there has been any overtures made in the pursuit of a uniform 
corporate governance regime in the region. Furthermore, this paper will examine what 
obstacles exist to establishing a uniform corporate governance regime in the region, 
as well as the features of a good corporate governance regime that will be of most 
benefit in the pursuit of economic integration. Lastly, it is submitted that it is necessary 
to explore existing corporate governance regimes (local and/or international) for 
guidance. 
 
It is submitted that the most apt approach would be to conduct desktop research in a 
legal comparative manner, using the applicable available sources, which include 
                                                          
7 According to the McKinsey and Company Investor Opinion Survey of 2000.  
8Wiese T ‘Corporate Governance in South Africa: With International Comparisons’ (2014) 2. 
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journal articles, textbooks, reports and internet sources. The use of a comparative 
study will examine the King Report on Corporate Governance for South Africa 
(specifically King III and King IV) primarily due to its internationally recognised status 
as a leading corporate governance code, as well as the OECD Principles on Corporate 
Governance due to their cross-border application within its member countries.  
 
Furthermore, the corporate governance legal systems of the United States (including 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, as well 
as the Principles of Corporate Governance of the New York Stock Exchange); the 
United Kingdom; China as well as the International Corporate Governance Network 
Global Governance Principles will be examined, primarily due to these countries’ and 
organisations’ positions as economic world-leaders. It is submitted that the 
presentation of this information will be of benefit in gaining a practical illustration of the 
manner in which corporate governance principles are manifested. 
 
However, before exploring the aforementioned, it is necessary to briefly touch on the 
concept and history of economic integration in the region so as to better understand it 
and the challenges the region currently faces.  
 
1.3 What is economic integration?  
 
Economic integration is defined as an agreement among countries in a geographic 
region to reduce and ultimately remove, tariff and non-tariff barriers to the free flow of 
goods or services and factors of production among each other’s’ regions.9   
Furthermore, it includes any type of arrangement in which countries agree to 
coordinate their trade, fiscal, and/or monetary policies are referred to as economic 
integration.10 The aim of economic integration is to reduce costs for both consumers 
                                                          
9Definition of economic integration available at http:/www.calculemus.org/pub-libr/eu-integr/1-2econ-
integr.pdf (accessed 25th September 2016).  
10 Definition of economic integration available at http:/www.calculemus.org/pub-libr/eu-integr/1-2econ-
integr.pdf (accessed 25th September 2016). 
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and producers, and to increase trade between the countries taking part in the 
agreement.11 
 
Economic integration between sovereign states has been regarded as one of the 
leading pursuits of international economic policy in the twentieth century, to the extent 
that this era has been dubbed ‘the age of integration’.12 With particular regard to the 
subject matter of this paper, economic integration has long been recognised as an 
important vehicle for Africa’s development,13 whilst the pursuit of integration rests 
significantly on the quality of technical and governance skills available to participating 
states.14 As such, integration remains one of contemporary Africa’s leading unresolved 
governance questions.15 
 
1.4 The background to SADC and the pursuit of economic integration in the region 
 
As is typically the case in significant watershed developments in the region during the 
more recent past, regional integration in Southern Africa stemmed from the 
involvement of African states, particularly those located in Southern Africa (the so-
called Frontline States),16 in the fight against apartheid in South Africa.17 As ever, the 
demise of white minority rule in the region proved to be the catalyst for the 
development of regional integration in the area.  
 
As the number of states attaining majority rule and freedom from colonial rule in the 
region increased, the motivations for their liberation struggle became redundant. In 
April 1980, nine Southern African states founded the Southern African Development 
Coordination Conference (‘SADCC’) in Lusaka, Zambia, when they signed a statement 
                                                          
11Definition of economic integration available at http:/www.investopedia.com/terms/e/economic-
integration (accessed 25th September 2016). 
12Robson P ‘Economic Integration in Africa’ (2011) 11.  
13 Corrigan T Puzzling Over the Pieces: Regional Integration and the African Peer Review Mechanism 
(2015)6.  
14Schmitter PC ‘Three neo functional hypotheses about international integration’, International 
Organisation, 23 1(1969) 161–166.  
15 Corrigan T Puzzling Over the Pieces: Regional Integration and the African Peer Review Mechanism 
(2015) 10.  
16Clough M & Ravenhill J “Regionalism in Southern Africa: the SADCC" in Clough M (ed) Political 
Change in Southern Africa (University of California Berkeley) 1982.  
17Saurombe A ‘The role of South Africa in SADC Regional Integration: the making or breaking of the 
organisation’ (2010) 5 3 Journal of International Commercial Law and Technology 124 125.  
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of strategy, Southern Africa: Towards Economic Liberation (the Lusaka Declaration).18 
SADCC was a loose and non-binding structure,19 but had more ambitious goals than 
the Frontline States, and was in particular aimed at reducing economic dependence 
on the then apartheid South Africa.20 
 
SADCC made significant inroads in securing external aid, but did not succeed in 
eroding the economic dependence of many of its members on South Africa. According 
to the late President of Botswana, Sir Seretse Khama, "economic dependence had in 
many ways made political independence somewhat meaningless".21 
 
Upon the demise of apartheid in South Africa in the early 1990s, the Heads of States 
of SADCC on 17 August 1992 turned SADCC (and its loose structure) into the 
Southern African Development Community (SADC), which will be examined in detail 
in Chapter 3 hereof.  
 
1.5 Foreign Direct Investment in Southern Africa 
 
It has already been submitted that attracting investment has been placed at the core 
of the development agenda for SADC. It is furthermore submitted that the lack of a 
developed business community and inadequate domestic savings makes attracting 
foreign investment critical for Africa, and in particular the Southern African region’s 
prospects.22 Accordingly, in light of the above it has been submitted that foreign direct 
investment has been a major catalyst of Africa’s economic growth over recent years.23 
 
It has been posited that if SADC governments want to successfully attract investors, 
they need to win the trust and confidence of same, to demonstrate that private 
                                                          
18Saurombe A ‘The role of South Africa in SADC Regional Integration: the making or breaking of the 
organisation’ (2010) 5 3 Journal of International Commercial Law and Technology 124 125. 
19Oosthuizen GH The Southern African Development Community: The Organisation, Its Policies and 
Prospects (Institute for Global Dialogue Midrand 2006) 
20Saurombe A ‘The role of South Africa in SADC Regional Integration: the making or breaking of the 
organisation’ (2010) 5 3 Journal of International Commercial Law and Technology 124 125. 
21Khama S African Research Bulletin 1979 51 – 55. 
22 22 Corrigan T Getting Down to Business: Lessons from the African Peer Review Mechanism (2014) 
61.  
23Corrigan T Getting Down to Business: Lessons from the African Peer Review Mechanism (2014) 61.  
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participation in infrastructure investment will ultimately be profitable, and to engage in 
more systematic regulatory and governance reforms.24 
 
A report by the Capital Markets Consultative Group has found that in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, particularly Southern Africa, most foreign direct investment is aimed at the 
extraction of the abundant natural resources in the region.25 As it has been found that 
most Southern African countries have business sectors consisting of mostly resource-
based activities,26 the concomitant importance of foreign direct investment (and as a 
result hereof, a favourable investor climate) becomes clear. It is for this reason that a 
healthy corporate governance regime can be deemed to be desirable in the region. 
 
However, this reliance on resource-based activities brings with it added responsibilities 
in respect of sustainability. Indeed, foreign direct investment has regularly courted 
controversy in this regard. Civil society and activists have voiced concerns about the 
impact of foreign investment, specifically the impact of mining.27 It is submitted that a 
sound corporate governance regime not only serves to create a favourable investor 
climate, but furthermore serves as a key balance against the excessive exploitation of 
resources.  
 
Furthermore, good corporate governance may give multinational firms engaging in 
foreign direct investment some form of reassurance against appropriation or unlawful 
losses from their investment.28 Good corporate governance at a macro-level may also 
have implications for whether firms can realise the benefits from their investments. For 
example, bad governance practices such as high levels of corruption or overly 
intrusive regulation can impede business activity in the recipient country.29 The 
apparent lack of such policies certainly does nothing to increase the appetite of 
                                                          
24OECD-SADC Policy Brief June 2015 available at http://www.oecd.org/dat/inv(accessed 25th 
September 2016).  
25Adeoye A Macroeconomic Level Corporate Governance and FDI in Emerging Markets: Is there a 
close relationship? (Masters of Management Science thesis, King’s College London, 2007) 13.  
26Sultan Balbuena, S. (2014), “State-owned Enterprises in Southern Africa: A Stocktaking of Reforms 
and Challenges”, OECD Corporate Governance Working Papers OECD Publishing 7.  
27Corrigan T Getting Down to Business: Lessons from the African Peer Review Mechanism (2014) 61. 
28Adeoye A Macroeconomic Level Corporate Governance and FDI in Emerging Markets: Is there a 
close relationship? (Masters of Management Science thesis, King’s College London, 2007) 27.  
29Adeoye A Macroeconomic Level Corporate Governance and FDI in Emerging Markets: Is there a 
close relationship? (Masters of Management Science thesis, King’s College London, 2007) 27.  
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investors. There is a consensus that good corporate governance improves the long-
term sustainability of companies by reducing risk, increasing shareholder activism in 
the company and maintaining public accountability.30 
 
1.6 The link between corporate governance and integration 
 
As submitted previously, among the fundamental goals of SADC is the economic 
growth and the complete integration of the member states. It has been submitted 
further that the member states’ economic growth depend on the success of the 
businesses operating within them, and these in turn depend on proper systems of 
regulation and governance.31 
Without a solid foundation of rules that are uniformly enforced, participants in the 
business sector have a harder time starting and growing the small and medium-size 
companies that are the instruments of growth and job creation for most economies 
around the world.32 Accordingly, there can be said to be an identifiable correlation 
between a proper system of corporate governance and economic growth and 
integration.  
In amplification of this, the essential objectives of a good corporate governance regime 
amongst companies have been identified as: 
 Leadership;  
 Oversight of management;  
 Ethical compliance with laws and regulations;  
 Risk management;  
 Achieving sustainability;  
 Transparency and disclosure;  
 Accountability and responsibility to stakeholders.33 
 
                                                          
30 Wiese T ‘Corporate Governance in South Africa: With International Comparisons’ (2014) 5.  
31Corrigan T Getting Down to Business: Lessons from the African Peer Review Mechanism (2014) 7.  
32 World Bank and IFC (International Finance Corporation), Doing Business 2014: Understanding 
Regulations for Small and Medium-Size Enterprises, 2013, p. v. 
33 Du Plessis, Hargovan & Bagaric Principles of Contemporary Corporate Governance 2 ed (2011) 11. 
This concept will be explored in further detail in Chapter Two. 
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A sound corporate governance regime has substantial implications for development in 
the region, in that it helps to provide a steady, predictable environment within which 
business decisions can be taken, and thereby contributes to wealth and employment 
creation.34 Furthermore, by its very nature, it does this with a view on the longer term, 
with corporate governance as an essential component of an overall agenda of 
sustainability and it contributes to building a culture of ethics and accountability, which 
is vital for the resilience of strong democracies and for the cultivation of a strong 
economy.35 
It has furthermore been posited that the promotion of the region’s development and 
regional integration can only be fostered in an environment that encourages good 
economic and corporate governance.36 In light hereof, the connection between a 
sound corporate governance regime and economic integration is clearly tangible.  
 
1.7 The ‘dual economy’ 
 
There exists literature which suggests that SADC countries mostly have branched 
economies, which is comprised of a ‘modern’ formal sector which exists 
simultaneously with a low-value adding, frequently informal sector.37 How this ‘sub-
economy’ fits into the economy proper, and what the prospects are for the more 
sophisticated stakeholders in this sub-economy to make the evolution to the formal 
sector, are important concerns, and in SADC this is particularly important when 
considering the size and relative international competitiveness of its ‘first economy’.  
It has been argued that the fundamental challenge being faced is how to formulate a 
corporate governance regime that works for such a dual economy and, in the long run, 
will succeed in bridging the first and second economies and promote the interests of 
historically disadvantaged groups.38 
 
 
                                                          
34 Corrigan T Getting Down to Business: Lessons from the African Peer Review Mechanism (2014) 9. 
35 Corrigan T Getting Down to Business: Lessons from the African Peer Review Mechanism (2014) 9. 
36 ‘Economic and Corporate Governance’ available at 
http://nepadbusinessfoundation.org/index.php/thematic-areas/economic-and-corporate-governance 
(accessed 10th October 2016).  
37Corrigan T Getting Down to Business: Lessons from the African Peer Review Mechanism (2014) 17. 
38 Panel of Eminent Persons, APRM, Country Review Report (CRR) of the Republic of South Africa, 
APRM Secretariat, May 2007, p. 159.  
 
 
 
 
16 
 
1.8 The Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (‘RISDP’)  
 
In March 2001, SADC Heads of State and Government met at an Extra-ordinary 
Summit in Windhoek, Namibia and approved the restructuring of SADC institutions, 
which Extra-ordinary Summit also approved the preparation of the Regional Indicative 
Strategic Development Plan (RISDP) by the Secretariat to complement restructuring 
and to provide a clear direction for SADC policies and programmes over the long 
term.39  
 
From a broader regional perspective, the RISDP defines good corporate governance 
in terms of sound macro-economic management; transparent public financial 
management and accountability; effective banking supervision and financial 
regulation; as well as a robust corporate governance regime.40 Accountability and 
transparency, coupled with enforcement of internationally accepted codes and 
standards are seen as the hallmark of good corporate governance.41 
It has been established that SADC's quest for poverty eradication and deeper levels 
of integration will not be realised if these standards are not in place, and it is thus clear 
that the RISDP recognises the inherent connection between a sound corporate 
governance regime and deep economic integration.42 There is clear understanding 
that the unification of the Region's economies through the SADC Free Trade Area 
(‘FTA’) and the quest to achieve deeper levels of integration will not be realised in the 
absence of good economic and corporate governance.43 
 
The off-shoot of fulfilling these objectives, particularly the reduction of risk and the 
achievement of sustainability, is that a favourable investor climate is created amongst 
                                                          
39The Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan available at http://www.sadc.int/about-
sadc/overview/strategic-pl/regional-indicative-strategic-development-plan/ (accessed 10th October 
2016).  
40 Corrigan T Getting Down to Business: Lessons from the African Peer Review Mechanism (2014) 
17.  
41SADC-UNECA Governance of Financial Institutions in Southern Africa: Issues for an Institutional 
Convergence Framework for Regional Financial Integration in SADC (2009) 43.  
42The Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan available at http://www.sadc.int/about-
sadc/overview/strategic-pl/regional-indicative-strategic-development-plan/ (accessed 10th October 
2016). 
43The Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan available at http://www.sadc.int/about-
sadc/overview/strategic-pl/regional-indicative-strategic-development-plan/ (accessed 10th October 
2016). 
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these compliant companies. Member states of SADC acknowledge that creating a 
favourable investment climate is central to diversifying their economies, creating new 
labour skills, developing infrastructure, and enhancing their participation in regional 
and global value chains.44 
 
Accordingly, it can be said that good corporate governance has a positive and 
significant impact on the flow of foreign direct investment to emerging markets, which 
would suggest that countries reliant on foreign direct investment (or at the very least, 
desirous of increasing same) should formulate and shape policies in this area to fully 
exploit their potential.45 If foreign direct investment is beneficial to emerging markets 
countries then it is crucial that proper policies are in place in respect of corporate 
governance in order to attract it.46 
 
Good governance, including accountable and transparent public resource 
management, is fundamental in establishing credibility that will attract investment 
resource flows. The New Partnership for Africa’s Development (‘NEPAD’) has 
identified and prioritised codes and standards for achieving good economic and 
corporate governance and in this context, it has been said that harmonisation of best 
practices in governance standards across the region for sound public financial 
management is an imperative.47 
 
Existing research makes it clear and convincing that the presence of weak institutions 
of economic and corporate governance acts as a constriction on sustainable 
development in Africa.48 The logic behind such an assertion, it is submitted, lies in the 
fact that investment is key to stimulating economic growth and development, and thus 
                                                          
44OECD-SADC Policy Brief June 2015 available at http://www.oecd.org/dat/inv(accessed 25 
September 2016). 
45Adeoye A Macroeconomic Level Corporate Governance and FDI in Emerging Markets: Is there a 
close relationship? (Masters of Management Science thesis, King’s College London, 2007) 4.  
46Adeoye A Macroeconomic Level Corporate Governance and FDI in Emerging Markets: Is there a 
close relationship? (Masters of Management Science thesis, King’s College London, 2007) 10.  
47The Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan available at http://www.sadc.int/about-
sadc/overview/strategic-pl/regional-indicative-strategic-development-plan/ (accessed 10th October 
2016). 
48Hope, K. 2005. ‘Towards Good Governance and Sustainable Development: The African Peer 
Review Mechanism’, Governance: an international journal of Policy, Administration and Institutions, 
18 (2) April 2005 286. 
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corporate governance is often defined as the ways in which suppliers of finance assure 
themselves that they will receive a fair return on their investments.49  
 
1.9 Conclusion  
 
In summary, it is submitted that it has been established that the presence of a sound 
corporate governance regime can almost be described as a pre-requisite for the 
achievement of SADC’s quest for poverty eradication, economic growth and (most 
importantly) economic integration, particularly in light of the region’s reliance on foreign 
direct investment and the growing trend of trade globalisation. As such, the benefits of 
formulating and implementing such a regime cannot be ignored, and indeed deserves 
further scrutiny.  
 
The fundamental characteristics of corporate governance, and its relation to the 
desired sustainability referred to above, is discussed in the following chapter.  
 
 
  
                                                          
49Tsumba L L ‘Corporate Governance Country Case Experience – Perspectives and Practices: 
Zimbabwe’ Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe 4.  
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CHAPTER 2: 
THE FUNDAMENTALS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
 
As indicated in Chapter One, this paper will seek to elucidate the fundamental details 
of corporate governance, as it is submitted that it will be necessary to do so in order 
to effectively ventilate the topic at hand.  
Accordingly, this chapter will delve into the details of corporate governance as a 
concept, including the definition; the need for corporate governance in general; the 
role-players; as well as the most prevalent theories. Furthermore, the notable 
legislative frameworks will be discussed and compared for the purposes of conducting 
a comparative study.  
 
2.1 Defining corporate governance  
To accurately define corporate governance would be akin to coming face to face with 
the mythical “Loch Ness Monster” – an absolute, definitive explanation of what 
corporate governance comprises does not exist, and any attempts to formulate one 
would be extremely difficult.  
However, quite typically, corporate governance generally holds various meanings 
within various countries. Although corporate governance can trace its roots to the 
Joint-Stock Companies Act of 1844 in the United Kingdom (‘UK’),50 it became a key 
issue of company law during the 1990’s, as a result of a large number of corporate 
problems and scandals of the late 1980’s.51 
South Africa followed the example of the UK, when the UK brought about changes 
recommended by the Cadbury, Greenbury and Hampel committees in response to 
numerous corporate scandals and widespread mismanagement.52 South Africa’s 
                                                          
50 Wiese T ‘Corporate Governance in South Africa: With International Comparisons’ (2014) 3.  
51Mongalo T ‘The Emergence of Corporate Governance as a Fundamental Research Topic in South 
Africa’ (2003) 120 SALJ 174.  
52Mongalo T ‘The Emergence of Corporate Governance as a Fundamental Research Topic in South 
Africa’ (2003) 120 SALJ 175.  
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efforts culminated in the formation of the King Committee, and its subsequent Code of 
Corporate Practices and Conduct.53 
As a result of the recommendations made by the King Committee, the interest in 
corporate governance in South Africa has dramatically increased.54 
However, for the purposes of the discussion at hand, an attempt will be made to 
identify the key characteristics of corporate governance. There exists a narrow 
definition of corporate governance, borne out of the origins of this particular branch of 
law and specifically out of the conflicts that arose as a result of the separation of 
“ownership”55 and “control”56 of companies.57 The resultant need for supervision and 
control of the managers gives rise to this narrow definition: the practice by which 
companies are managed and controlled.58 
More recently, it became increasingly evident that this narrow interpretation can no 
longer adequately encompass how corporate governance has evolved and continues 
to evolve. Companies have a pronounced effect on the society and environment within 
which they operate, and indeed the size of companies are growing ever larger, close 
to the size of states and often bigger.59 
Thus the need for a more “universal” definition is required, which is touted as being:  
“the system of regulating and overseeing corporate conduct and of balancing 
the interests of all internal stakeholders and other parties who can be affected 
by the corporation’s conduct, in order to ensure responsible behaviour by 
corporations and to achieve the maximum level of efficiency and profitability for 
a corporation.”60 
 
 
                                                          
53 Wiese T ‘Corporate Governance in South Africa: With International Comparisons’ (2014) 3. 
54Mongalo T ‘The Emergence of Corporate Governance as a Fundamental Research Topic in South 
Africa’ (2003) 120 SALJ 175.  
55 The shareholders.  
56 The directors.  
57 Wiese T ‘Corporate Governance in South Africa: With International Comparisons’ (2014) 2. 
58 Wiese T ‘Corporate Governance in South Africa: With International Comparisons’ (2014) 2.  
59Mongalo T ‘The Emergence of Corporate Governance as a Fundamental Research Topic in South 
Africa’ (2003) 120 SALJ 176.  
60 Wiese T ‘Corporate Governance in South Africa: With International Comparisons’ (2014) 2.  
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2.2 The need for corporate governance 
Corporate governance, as described above, is seen as the answer to the corporate 
scandals that erupted in the latter part of the 20th century.61 It became apparent that 
the lack of proper protection against the abuse of power by directors of companies, 
and the lack of proper vigilance by non-executive directors was a critical matter that 
would be unsustainable in the long-term and thus required addressing.62 
Corporate governance is more than just the running of a company. Tricker states that, 
“If management is about running the business, then governance is about seeing that 
it is run properly. All companies therefore need governing as well as managing”.63 
Furthermore, it has been submitted that all stakeholders have vested interests in the 
sustainability of companies, and resultantly an environment of interdependence is 
created amongst companies and their stakeholders.64 
From this, it can be gleaned that corporate governance is, when stripped down to its 
bare basics, all about ensuring the sustainability of companies. It is submitted that the 
objectives identified in chapter 1, namely leadership; oversight of management; ethical 
conduct; transparency; and accountability are effectively tools for the achievement of 
sustainability of the company, for the benefit of the stakeholders.  
 
2.3 The role-players in corporate governance 
The identifying of the role-players in the sphere of corporate governance is an aspect 
that can potentially be difficult to pinpoint, particularly in light of the wider definition 
ascribed to corporate governance in recent times. The King Report on Corporate 
Governance for South Africa (King IV) differentiates between internal stakeholders and 
external stakeholders, which can be identified as follows:  
1. Shareholders (internal);  
2. Employees (internal);  
                                                          
61 Wiese T ‘Corporate Governance in South Africa: With International Comparisons’ (2014) 3. 
62Mongalo T ‘The Emergence of Corporate Governance as a Fundamental Research Topic in South 
Africa’ (2003) 120 SALJ 187. 
63Tricker R I (ed) Corporate Governance (2000). 
64Wiese T ‘Corporate Governance in South Africa: With International Comparisons’ (2014) 13.  
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3. Creditors (external);  
4. Customers (external);  
5. The community (external);  
6. The environment (external);  
7. Government (external);  
8. Trade Unions (external).65 
Corporate governance is said to be a strategic process, which is primarily the 
responsibility of the directors – it involves the delegation of power from the directors 
to the managers, and ensuring accountability to all stakeholders in the company.66 
There are two contrasting views on who the stakeholders are in the world of corporate 
governance. There is the “shareholder centric approach”, which stipulates that the 
directors of companies are to consider the interests of the shareholders first and 
foremost (as they are the source of the company’s capital).67 Any other parties’ 
interests are only considered to the extent that it would be in the interest of the 
shareholders to do so.68 This, it is clear, is a fairly narrow and ostensibly out-dated 
view.  
In contrast, the “stakeholder approach” stipulates that directors are required to 
consider the interests of all stakeholders in the company (not just the shareholders), 
by striking a balance between social and economic goals and serving the best 
interests of the company itself.69 The striking feature of this viewpoint is the fact that it 
encompasses both the formal and informal relationship between companies and their 
stakeholders, be it creditors, suppliers, customers, civil society et al.70 The stakeholder 
approach has been seen to become a benchmark on corporate governance globally, 
and the OECD Principles on Corporate Governance embody same in their content.71 
                                                          
65This list is not exhaustive.  
66 Wiese T ‘Corporate Governance in South Africa: With International Comparisons’ (2014) 3.  
67Mongalo T ‘The Emergence of Corporate Governance as a Fundamental Research Topic in South 
Africa’ (2003) 120 SALJ 176.  
68 Wiese T ‘Corporate Governance in South Africa: With International Comparisons’ (2014) 8.  
69 Wiese T ‘Corporate Governance in South Africa: With International Comparisons’ (2014) 9.  
70Mongalo T ‘The Emergence of Corporate Governance as a Fundamental Research Topic in South 
Africa’ (2003) 120 SALJ 173.  
71Jesover F, Kirkpatrick G ‘The Revised OECD Principles of Corporate Governance and their 
Relevance to Non-OECD Countries’ Corporate Governance: an International Review January 2005 4.  
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Indeed, the recently published King Report on Corporate Governance for South Africa 
(King IV) advocates that in the execution of its duties, the company should adopt a 
stakeholder-inclusive approach that balances the interests of stakeholders with the 
best interests of the company over time.72  
For the purposes of this study, and because it is submitted that the stakeholder 
approach best encapsulated the ethos of what corporate governance is in this current 
day and age, this paper will determine a corporate governance regime that falls to be 
categorised in this approach.  
 
2.4 Comparative overview of Corporate Governance Frameworks 
The problems facing SADC are naturally of an international dimension in that it has 
implications for all of its member states. Thus, as mentioned in chapter 1, a 
comparative study will be useful, which will examine the King Report on Corporate 
Governance for South Africa (King III and King IV) as well as the OECD Principles on 
Corporate Governance due to its cross-border application within its member countries 
and, inter alia, the corporate governance systems of the United States of America and 
the United Kingdom.  
It is prudent to touch upon the basic aspects of these systems briefly, as a detailed 
discourse will result in something resembling a novella rather than a humble research 
paper.  
 
2.4.1 United States of America 
The United States of America is a federal republic made up of fifty states,73 and 
is the largest economy in the world with a GDP of about $16.8 trillion which 
                                                          
72 King IV principle 16. 
73 Brown L ‘States Matter: America Is a Federal Republic’ New York Times 8 August 2013 available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2013/07/16/state-politics-vs-the-federal-government/states-
matter-america-is-a-federal-republic (accessed 25th September 2016). 
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constitutes 24% if the world’s gross product.74 It is a founder and still a member 
of the Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).75 
 
Delaware General Corporation Law (DGCL) 
Corporations, in the United States, are incorporated directly under the 
regulation of each specific state’s law.76  However, most corporations are 
incorporated in the state of Delaware because of the corporate tax breaks 
offered by the state.77 As a result of this courts in Delaware have developed 
case law establishing principles of corporate governance.78 An example of one 
such principle is that managers hold fiduciary duties of care, candour and 
loyalty to the shareholders.79 
In addition to the Delaware General Corporation Law, the following laws 
regulate corporate governance in the United States: 
a. ABA Model Business Corporation Law 
This is a model law that is prepared by the American Bar Association 
and is applied in 24 states.80 The Delaware Act and the Model Business 
Corporation Law ensure that corporations are under an obligation to 
abide by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.81 This ensures that 
companies take into consideration interests of different stakeholders that 
are associated with it, including shareholders, creditors, communities 
and anyone who is deemed to have a vested interest in terms hereof.82  
 
                                                          
74IMF ‘World Economic Outlook’ available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2014/02/weodata/index.aspx (accessed 7 August 2015).  
75 OECD ‘History’ available at http://www.oecd.org/about/history/ (accessed 25th September 2016). 
76Armour J, Hansmann H, &Kraakman R ‘The essential elements of corporate law: what is  corporate 
law?’ (2009) Harvard John M. Olin Center For Law, Economics, And Business Discussion Paper No. 
643 24 
77 P Ryan ‘Will there ever be a “Delaware of Europe?”’ (Winter 2004/2005) 11 Columbia Journal of 
European Law 187.  
78Emmerich AO, Savitt W, Niles SV &Ongun S ‘United States’ in Calkoen WJL (ed.)The Corporate 
Governance Review (2013) 401.  
79Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984). 
80Bebchuk L ‘The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power' (2004-5) 118 Harvard Law Review 844. 
81 Bebchuk L ‘The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power' (2004-5) 118 Harvard Law Review 844. 
82 ABA Model Business Corporation Law Sec 8.11. 
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b. Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 (SEA) 
Section 19(b) (1) of the SEA provides for corporate governance 
regulations, specifically self-regulated organisations. It authorises 
individual securities markets to determine the requirement that needs to 
be fulfilled by corporations before they can be listed or allowed to trade 
within these markets. Once the Securities Exchange Committee 
approves the rules set down by the securities markets, then the rules 
take effect.  
c. Code of Financial Regulations  
Title 17 of the Code of Financial Regulations on Commodity and 
Securities Exchanges provides for regulations on corporate governance. 
These regulations emphasise, amongst others, the independence of the 
board.83 
d. Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
Signed into law on 30th July 2002, the Act was geared towards 
engendering transparency and accountability in the manner in which 
corporations are run. Section 301 of Sarbanes-Oxley obligates a listed 
company to have an audit committee which oversees an independent 
auditor. The members of the committee must be independent of the 
management.84 This is set to ensure that the audits carried out are 
truthful.  
e. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 
The Dodd-Frank Act was a response to the financial crisis of 2008-2009. 
It was intended to, inter alia; address the issue of executive pay and 
ensure that taxpayers are not called upon to bail out corporations even 
if their failure threatens the economy.85 
                                                          
83 Cornell University Legal Information Institute ‘17 CFR 229.407 - (Item 407) Corporate governance’ 
available at https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/17/229.407 (accessed 25th September 2016). 
84 Section 407.  
85 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Preamble.  
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The Act obligates a corporation to inform investors why a person should 
serve as a chairman of the board of directors and the chief executive 
officer at the same time or why a person should not serve the two posts 
simultaneously.86 This is to ensure engender balance of power in the 
corporation.87 
Furthermore, a number of non-legislative recommendations on corporate 
governance have been published in the USA. These include the American Law 
Institute’s Principles of Corporate Governance and Structure: Restatement and 
Recommendations, the New York Stock Exchange’s (NYSE) Principles of 
Corporate Governance,88 the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance 
(2004). For the purposes of this discussion, focus is placed on the Principles of 
Corporate Governance by the NYSE.  
NYSE Principles of Corporate Governance 
The NYSE compiled the comprehensive review of its own corporate 
governance structure in the wake of the 2008/2009 global financial crisis.89 The 
corporate principles of the NYSE report require directors to be independent, to 
ensure successful governance.90 
The directors are required to put up appropriate risk management 
mechanisms;91 create long-term sustainability and growth;92  establish and 
maintain an ethical ‘tone at the top’;93 have a duty to shareholdersto act with 
care and loyalty, as well as with transparency.94 These concepts are clearly 
aimed at promoting responsible conduct amongst companies, in the pursuit of 
sustainability and as a preventative measure against a recurrence of the 
aforementioned crises.  
                                                          
86 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act Sec 972. 
87 Sonnenfeld JA ‘The Jamie Dimon Witch Hunt’ The New York Times 8 May 2013 available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/09/opinion/the-jamie-dimon-witch-hunt.html?_r=0 (accessed 
25September 2016). 
88 Wiese T Corporate Governance in South Africa: With International Comparisons (2014) 62. 
89 Report of the NYSE Commission (2010) 2.  
90 Report of the NYSE Commission (2010) 25. 
91 Report of the NYSE Commission (2010) 26. 
92 Report of the NYSE Commission (2010) 26. 
93 Report of the NYSE Commission (2010) 27. 
94 Report of the NYSE Commission (2010) 28. 
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2.4.2 International Corporate Governance Network Global Governance Principles 
The International Corporate Governance Network (ICGN) was established in 
1995, and developed the ICGN Global Governance Principles, which are 
largely slanted in favour of the shareholder.95  
The ICGN principles require the board of directors to act in the best interests of 
the company, and with good faith, care and diligence for the benefit of the 
shareholders.96 It furthermore requires the board to be made up of a majority of 
independent directors, the appointment of whom must be transparent.97 
In addition, the board of directors must adopt and maintain high standards of 
business ethics and oversee a culture of integrity.98 
 
2.4.3 King Report on Corporate Governance for South Africa  
As stated before, the King Report on Corporate Governance is internationally 
lauded for its efforts in fostering sound corporate governance practices 
amongst companies, and thus warrants examination in this paper. The King 
Committee has very recently released the King Report on Corporate 
Governance for South Africa 2016 (‘King IV’)99, which will be explored, in 
conjunction with the current King Report on Corporate Governance for South 
Africa of 2009 (‘King III’).  
The content of The King Report is seen as a recommendation and as a general 
point of departure compliance is thus voluntary, but it inspires listing regulations 
at the Johannesburg Securities Exchange and is accordingly compulsory for 
these companies. 
The philosophy of King III revolves around effective leadership, sustainability 
and corporate citizenship.100 Compliance with the recommendations of King III 
                                                          
95 Wiese T Corporate Governance in South Africa: With International Comparisons (2014) 46. 
96Principle 1.1 of the ICGN Principles.  
97Principle 3 of the ICGN Principles.  
98Principle 4.1 of the ICGN Principles. 
99 Due to take effect on 1 April 2017.  
100 Wiese T Corporate Governance in South Africa: With International Comparisons (2014) 20. 
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is voluntary, on the ‘apply or explain’ principle, which involves a consideration 
by the board of how the principles and recommendations can be applied.101 
The principles of King III recommend that the board is responsible for effective 
corporate governance, and should be mindful of same when determining the 
company strategy.102 It also recommends a formal and transparent process for 
appointment of directors,103 establishment of board committees, responsible 
Information Technology (IT) governance104 and full and integrated reporting and 
disclosure. King III supplements the corporate governance regulations already 
in the Companies Act of South Africa.105 
The major differences in King IV can be elucidated as follows:  
i. King IV is streamlined to include 16 consolidated principles, as opposed 
to the 75 principles of King III;  
ii. King III required companies to apply or explain insofar as the principles 
were concerned, King IV assumes application of all principles, and 
requires entities to explain how the principles are applied. This is referred 
to as the ‘apply and explain’ philosophy; 
iii. King IV seeks to reconcile with the legislative minimum requirements 
placed on companies by advocating an approach whereby the principles 
are adapted to ‘fit in’ with sectoral contexts and legislative regimes.106 
iv. Remuneration of directors has a more prominent role (although it merely 
requires a non-binding advisory vote of shareholders);  
v. King IV requires active stakeholders to hold the Board to account for their 
actions and disclosures. In particular, according to King IV principle 17, 
the governing body of an institutional investor should ensure that 
responsible investment practices are observed by the company to 
promote good governance and the creation of value by the companies 
in which it invests.107;  
                                                          
101 Wiese T Corporate Governance in South Africa: With International Comparisons (2014) 21. 
102 King III principle 2.1 – 2.2.  
103 King III principle 2.18.  
104 King III principle 5.  
105 Act 71 of 2008.  
106 The King Report on Corporate Governance for South Africa 2016 (‘King IV’).  
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vi. The governance framework of the company must be agreed upon and 
implemented by the company board, and not by any subsidiary boards 
(as was the case with King III).108 
 
2.4.4 OECD Principles of Corporate governance 
The OECD principles provide for guidance for policymakers, regulators and 
market participants in improving the legal, institutional and regulatory 
framework that underpins corporate governance within its member countries 
and, as such, are non-binding.109 These guidelines include recommendations 
for effective corporate governance through promotion of transparency, rule of 
law and clear differentiation of the powers and responsibilities of the various 
personnel.110 
They also provide practical guidance and suggestions for stock exchanges, 
investors, corporations and other parties that have a role in the process of 
developing good corporate governance.  
 
The essential facets of the OECD principles can be elucidated as follows:111 
 
I. Ensuring the basis for an effective corporate governance framework  
 
The corporate governance framework should promote transparent and efficient 
markets, be consistent with the rule of law and promote efficient allocation of 
resources. 
 
II. The rights of shareholders and key ownership functions 
 
The corporate governance framework should protect and facilitate the exercise 
of shareholders’ rights, including minority and foreign shareholders.  
 
                                                          
108 Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu Limited report on King IV (2016).  
109Jesover F, Kirkpatrick G ‘The Revised OECD Principles of Corporate Governance and their 
Relevance to Non-OECD Countries’ Corporate Governance: an International Review January 2005 2.  
110 OECD Principles of Corporate Governance 17.  
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III. Institutional investors, stock markets, and other intermediaries 
  
The corporate governance framework should provide sound incentives 
throughout the investment chain and provide for stock markets to function in a 
way that contributes to good corporate governance.  
 
IV. The role of stakeholders in corporate governance 
  
The corporate governance framework should recognise the rights of 
stakeholders established by law or through mutual agreements and encourage 
active co-operation between corporations and stakeholders in creating wealth, 
jobs, and the sustainability of financially sound enterprises. 
 
V. Disclosure and transparency 
 
The corporate governance framework should ensure that timely and accurate 
disclosure is made on all material matters regarding the corporation, including 
the financial situation, performance, ownership, and governance of the 
company. 
 
VI. The responsibilities of the board 
 
The corporate governance framework should ensure the strategic guidance of 
the company, the effective monitoring of management by the board, and the 
board’s accountability to the company and the shareholders. 
 
It is submitted that the OECD can be used as an example of what can be achieved by 
a group of countries in the pursuit of economic integration with the use of sound 
corporate governance principles. The OECD is regarded as a unique forum where 34 
member state economies work with each other, as well as with more than 70 non-
member state economies to promote economic growth, prosperity, and sustainable 
development.112 
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Furthermore, it is accepted that the OECD principles on corporate governance have 
significant impact and relevance to non-member countries.113 Indeed, the OECD 
already has in place the OECD Network on Corporate Governance of State-Owned 
Enterprises in Southern Africa, which includes the SADC member states (amongst 
others).114 This network was launched in 2007 to support efforts to improve the 
performance of state-owned enterprises by raising awareness of the benefits of 
governance and influencing policy-making based on experience and expert 
knowledge.115 
 
It is evident from the above discussion that there exist a number of similarities amongst 
these various corporate governance regimes. Chief among these are the following:  
 A fiduciary duty on directors to maintain ethical leadership;  
 Independence of directors;  
 The requirement of transparency and accountability;  
 The requirement of acting in the best interests of the company and the 
stakeholders;  
 Recognition of the rights and interests of stakeholders (and not only 
shareholders);  
 A focus on long-term sustainability.116  
 
These concepts tie in with the essential objectives of a good corporate governance 
regime which were identified in chapter 1 as being leadership; oversight of 
management; ethical conduct; risk management; sustainability; transparency and 
accountability.  
 
                                                          
113Jesover F, Kirkpatrick G ‘The Revised OECD Principles of Corporate Governance and their 
Relevance to Non-OECD Countries’ Corporate Governance: an International Review January 2005 5.  
114 Corporate Governance of State-Owned Enterprises in Southern Africa available at 
http:/www.oecd.org (accessed 17 July 2016).  
115 Corporate Governance of State-Owned Enterprises in Southern Africa available at 
http:/www.oecd.org (accessed 17 July 2016). 
116Wiese T Corporate Governance in South Africa: With International Comparisons (2014) 64.  
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It is submitted that these are critical in the composition of any corporate governance 
regime, and accordingly the most important of these (sustainability and transparency) 
are discussed in further detail here below.  
 
2.5 Sustainability 
In light of the aforesaid discussions, it is apparent that there is an inherent prominence 
placed on the concept of sustainability, seeing as it is referenced in the OECD 
principles on corporate governance, the King Report on Corporate Governance for 
South Africa, and the legislative frameworks of China, the U.K. and the United States. 
Accordingly, it is submitted that sustainability is one word that can be argued to 
encapsulate the very essence of corporate governance and is explored here in some 
detail insofar as it relates to SADC and its goals.  
Generally speaking, in terms of good corporate governance policies, companies must 
strive to operate in a manner that is sustainable to the stakeholder, society and the 
environment.117 The relevance to the Southern African region however, is more 
specific. It has been said that Africa has been fortunate in recent years in being able 
to depend on revenues from its natural resources, but that this is not an indefinitely 
sustainable strategy.118 It requires a community of value-adding, innovative 
entrepreneurs to take it forward. 
The long-term sustainability of companies in the region is dependent on a healthy 
environment and the availability of resources, and companies should thus take 
cognisance of the various factors that affect the environment in its operations.119 All 
stakeholders, including shareholders, have an interest in the long-term sustainability 
of the company.120 As stated earlier in Chapter 1, the pursuit of foreign direct 
investment brings with it added pressure in respect of sustainability. 
It is a well-known truism that sustainability reporting enables organisations of all types, 
including companies and public agencies, to measure, manage and publicly disclose 
                                                          
117 Mafatle T S The Evolution of Corporate Social Responsibility (LLM Thesis abstract, 2009) 4. 
118Corrigan T Getting Down to Business: Lessons from the African Peer Review Mechanism (2014)69. 
119 Wiese T ‘Corporate Governance in South Africa: With International Comparisons’ (2014) 8.  
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their economic, environmental and social performance,121 particularly the 
environmental impact of this performance.   
It is submitted that, in policy terms, research indicates that three courses of action are 
clear.122 Firstly, better quality basics, such as better education, better infrastructure 
and increased management capacity in government are all critical for long-term 
sustainability. Secondly, a more amenable regulatory environment is necessary. 
Clear, understandable, implementable and impartially enforced regulations are 
essential to any country. These must be conceptualised with a view to both curbing 
undesirable behaviour and facilitating the day-to-day conduct of business. The goal 
should be better regulation rather than deregulation.123 
 
2.6 Transparency and accountability: 
The concept of transparency is another that is inextricably linked to the premise of an 
effective corporate governance regime. There is an increasing demand for greater 
transparency in the corporate environment, and thereby greater accountability.124 
According to the London-based think tank SustainAbility, this decade was supposed 
to have been seen as the ‘Transparency Decade’.125 A series of major incidents forced 
early pioneers of transparency to lift the veil, so to speak, and issue economic social 
and environmental reports. It has since been suggested that the first decade of the 
21st century might become the ‘Trust Decade’. This decade was to be based on ever 
increasing transparency, accountability and integrated reporting.126  
However, the events of past few years have turned out to facilitate a culture of distrust. 
As a result of the global financial crisis and several corporate scandals, there is a 
general climate of distrust regarding companies’ ability to self-regulate.127 
                                                          
121 Carrots and Sticks – Promoting Transparency and Sustainability 6.  
122 Corrigan T Getting Down to Business: Lessons from the African Peer Review Mechanism (2014) 
69. 
123 Corrigan T Getting Down to Business: Lessons from the African Peer Review Mechanism (2014) 
69.  
124Carrots and Sticks – Promoting Transparency and Sustainability 7.  
125Carrots and Sticks – Promoting Transparency and Sustainability 7.  
126 Carrots and Sticks – Promoting Transparency and Sustainability 7.  
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Consequently, the general public is demanding an increased role to be played by 
governments in the sustainability reporting sphere.128 
As mentioned in chapter 1, there is some understanding amongst researchers that the 
unification of the Southern African region’s economies through the SADC free trade 
area129 and the quest to achieve deeper levels of integration as desired in terms of the 
SADC treaty will not be realised in the absence of good economic and corporate 
governance.130 
Without doubt, there are benefits to be derived from the principles of transparency and 
accountability. An important benefit of transparency is that it earns the national and 
regional institutions the public trust that is necessary to forward the regional integration 
agenda.131 Accountability and transparency increase the public’s confidence and the 
corporation’s credibility, which coincidentally are two essential ingredients for the 
luring of investment. 
Transparency furthermore allows decisions to be better informed, while better 
accountability imposes firmer discipline on decision-makers. Together, these will 
contribute to higher-quality decisions in the proposed regional institutions in the SADC 
region132 and in the pursuit of integration.  
 
2.7 The state of the corporate governance landscape in the region 
As alluded to at the introduction of this chapter, it is important to touch on the current 
corporate governance landscape of the region, which, it is submitted, is significantly 
lacking. One of the reasons why corporate governance is in an embryonic state in 
Africa, despite the obvious need for a robust framework regulating same (particularly 
in the Southern African region, as is to be discussed in this paper), is due to the fact 
that the state-owned sector is considerable in its size which is a result of the legacy of 
                                                          
128 Carrots and Sticks – Promoting Transparency and Sustainability 7.  
129 The Member states of the SADC have formed a free trade area amongst themselves, wherein 
trade duties and other restrictive regulations (internally) are eliminated on substantially all trade 
between participant member states.  
130 SADC-UNECA Governance of Financial Institutions in Southern Africa: Issues for an Institutional 
Convergence Framework for Regional Financial Integration in SADC (2009). 
131 The so-called ‘licence to operate’.  
132 SADC-UNECA Governance of Financial Institutions in Southern Africa: Issues for an Institutional 
Convergence Framework for Regional Financial Integration in SADC (2009).  
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past statist economic policies.133 Indeed, state-owned companies are believed to 
make up the largest part of the economy in Southern Africa,134 and accordingly this 
section will deal specifically with state-owned enterprises.  
Accordingly, the lack of a coherent and effective corporate governance framework, 
together with deficient infrastructure, corruption, and inadequately trained workforce 
within state-owned entities are among the obstacles that are prevalent in the business 
environment within the SADC region.135 
By way of an example, it is accepted that proper board appointments are critical in 
terms of good corporate governance. However, government involvement in the board 
selection of state-owned enterprises is inevitable and necessary, although various 
checks and balances can be applied to mitigate the potential negative effect of this 
aspect and ensure appropriate candidates are appointed.136   
Another important issue is whether such board appointments are geared towards 
furthering a political agenda, and whether boards are able to operate without political 
interference once appointed.137 As a point of reference, it is useful to note that the 
OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance of State Owned Enterprises is clear that 
state-owned enterprises’ boards should act in the best interests of the entities they 
control, exercise independent judgement and treat all stakeholders equitably.138 
One of the most urgent challenges in the region and which has a direct influence on 
the efficacy of any corporate governance regime is the need for clear ownership 
policies amongst state-owned enterprises.139 An ownership policy, specifying the 
purpose of state ownership and the expectations of the state, is a prerequisite to 
providing individual state-owned enterprises with clear objectives and guidance in 
                                                          
133 Corrigan T Policy Briefing 101 ‘Building an African Corporate Governance’ August 2014.  
134 Sultan Balbuena, S. (2014), “State-owned Enterprises in Southern Africa: A Stocktaking of 
Reforms and Challenges”, OECD Corporate Governance Working Papers OECD Publishing 7.  
135 Corrigan T Policy Briefing 101 ‘Building an African Corporate Governance’ August 2014. 
136OECD, Working Party on State Ownership and Privatisation Practices, Board of Directors of 
State-Owned Enterprises: An Overview of National Practices (2012) 16.  
137 Corrigan T Getting Down to Business: Lessons from the African Peer Review Mechanism 
(2014)65. 
138 Corrigan T Getting Down to Business: Lessons from the African Peer Review Mechanism 
(2014)65.  
139 Sultan Balbuena, S. (2014), “State-owned Enterprises in Southern Africa: A Stocktaking of 
Reforms and Challenges”, OECD Corporate Governance Working Papers OECD Publishing 10. 
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terms of corporate governance, and ensures that the government, acting as owner, is 
guided by a consistent and coherent approach.140 
For some countries, the establishing of legislation for state-owned enterprises may 
pose as a constriction, while for others the challenge is the lack of a clear 
categorisation of state-owned enterprise activities and subsequent separation 
between social/developmental and commercial activities.141 A number of countries are 
working towards establishing ownership policies and reinforcing their governance 
practices through the establishment of governance codes applicable to state-owned 
enterprises and other public commercial entities.142 Indeed, the King Report on 
Corporate Governance for South Africa (King IV) includes a supplement specifically 
and exclusively applicable to state-owned entities.143 
The OECD Guidelines on the Corporate Governance of SOEs recommends a central 
organisation – or at least a strong coordination – of the ownership function. However, 
this recommendation is made in a specific economic and administrative context that 
may or may not be applicable to the SADC region.144 
Centralised ownership may be either an advantage or a challenge, depending on the 
strength of existing governance frameworks; the size and volume of state-owned 
enterprises’ portfolios; and the resources, capacities and integrity of the ownership 
function.145 The question of whether to favour a centralised ownership function versus 
a decentralised or dual structure has not been sufficiently scrutinised in practice 
among Southern Africa economies, and it has been argued that merely changing the 
ownership regime of a region’s state-owned enterprises’ will not address all their 
problems, particularly when these relate to their operational effectiveness and 
ensuring integrity.146 
                                                          
140Corrigan T Policy Briefing 102 ‘Corporate Governance in Africa’s State-Owned Enterprises: 
Perspectives on an Evolving System’ September 2014. 
141 Sultan Balbuena, S. (2014), “State-owned Enterprises in Southern Africa: A Stocktaking of 
Reforms and Challenges”, OECD Corporate Governance Working Papers OECD Publishing 10. 
142South African Institute of Directors (2009) 
143 The King Report on Corporate Governance for South Africa (2016) Part 6.6.  
144OECD Guidelines On Corporate Governance Of State-Owned Enterprises.  
145 Sultan Balbuena, S. (2014), “State-owned Enterprises in Southern Africa: A Stocktaking of 
Reforms and Challenges”, OECD Corporate Governance Working Papers OECD Publishing 14.  
146Corrigan T Policy Briefing 102 ‘Corporate Governance in Africa’s State-Owned Enterprises: 
Perspectives on an Evolving System’ September 2014. 
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It is submitted, in light of the above, that the corporate governance landscape in the 
region is beset with numerous challenges. It has been posited that strengthening the 
corporate governance policies via changing the ownership policy will be a step in the 
right direction.147 
 
2.8 Conclusion  
It is clear from the aforegoing that at the heart of a sound corporate governance regime 
lies concepts such as ethical leadership, sustainability, transparency, acting in the best 
interests of the stakeholders et al, and that furthermore these are not overwhelmingly 
prevalent in the region currently. Accordingly, any attempts at formulating a uniform 
corporate governance regime in the region must seek to amalgamate the 
characteristics of the above-mentioned frameworks.  
This paper will now turn to the structure and functioning of SADC and the apparent 
obstacles to integration in the region.  
 
  
                                                          
147 Corrigan T Policy Briefing 102 ‘Corporate Governance in Africa’s State-Owned Enterprises: 
Perspectives on an Evolving System’ September 2014.  
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CHAPTER 3: 
THE SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY AND THE 
CHALLENGES IT CURRENTLY FACES 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
As alluded to in chapter one, it is necessary to examine the structure and functioning 
of SADC in order to gain a firm grasp of the challenges facing the region in its pursuit 
of economic integration. This chapter will serve to survey the institutional framework 
of SADC, and how same relates to the pursuit of integration.  
 
SADC was formally established in 1992 in Windhoek, Namibia, with the ambitious goal 
of developing a regional economic community which would be fully integrated amongst 
its member states.148 Article 5(1)(a) of the Southern African Development Community 
Treaty (the SADC Treaty) places economic growth and development at the top of the 
SADC objectives.149 The focus was on deepening regional economic integration, 
SADC’s aims are more ambitious than its predecessor’s.150 
 
Subsequently, and commencing in the mid-1990s, SADC embarked on a 
comprehensive review and reorganisation process, particularly targeting SADC’s 
decentralised co-operation model, its management framework, and the lack of clarity 
and specificity in its goals (the details of which will be discussed more fully in the 
ensuing chapters).151 The recommendations in the review report were incorporated 
into the Agreement Amending the Treaty of the SADC, which entered into force on 14 
August 2001, upon its signature by the member states.152 
 
However, SADC has been hindered by a number of obstacles in its pursuit of the type 
of integration that will unlock its economic growth and development. The SADC 
                                                          
148De Wet E ‘The Rise and Fall of the Tribunal of the Southern African Development Community: 
Implications for Dispute Settlement in Southern Africa’ (2013) 28 ICSID Review 45 45.  
149De Wet E ‘The Rise and Fall of the Tribunal of the Southern African Development Community: 
Implications for Dispute Settlement in Southern Africa’ (2013) 28 ICSID Review 45 46.  
150Saurombe A ‘The role of South Africa in SADC Regional Integration: the making or breaking of the 
organisation’ (2010) 5 3 Journal of International Commercial Law and Technology 124 125. 
151Saurombe A ‘The role of South Africa in SADC Regional Integration: the making or breaking of the 
organisation’ (2010) 5 3 Journal of International Commercial Law and Technology 124 125.  
152 About the SADC available at http://www.sadc.int/about-sadc/ (accessed 20th November 2016).  
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member states are apparently not readily willing to subject themselves to 
supranational governance (as provided for by the SADC Treaty) and the resultant 
encroachment on their sovereignty.153 Thus, as a result of their resistance to 
supranational institutions, SADC is arranged in a decentralised manner which serves 
as a hindrance to deeper integration.154 
 
3.2 Structure and Functioning of SADC 
 
The SADC Treaty provides the legal framework of the organisation by setting out the 
status,155 principles and objectives,156 and obligations of Member States;157 the 
membership,158 the institutions,159 procedural matters relating to areas of cooperation 
among Member States,160 cooperation with other international organisations,161 
financial issues,162 dispute settlement,163 as well as sanctions, withdrawal and 
dissolution.164 The SADC Treaty makes provision for the formulation of subsidiary 
legal instruments such as protocols giving specific mandates to various SADC 
institutions.  
 
The arrangement of SADC was heavily influenced by previous failures of attempts at 
economic integration, which failures stemmed largely from indecision on how to 
equitably share costs and benefits of such integration.165 As a result, SADC is 
structured in a decentralised manner, in order to avoid supranational institutions.166 
 
                                                          
153Saurombe A ‘The Role of SADC Institutions in Implementing SADC Treaty Provisions Dealing with 
Regional Integration’ (2012) 15 2 PER/PELJ 454 454.  
154Mattli W ‘The Logic of Regional Integration: Europe and Beyond’ (1999).  
155Article 14 of SADC Treaty (1992).  
156Chapter 3 Aa 4 and 5 of SADC Treaty (1992).  
157Article 6 of SADC Treaty (1992). 
158Chapter 4 Aa 37 and 8 of SADC Treaty (1992).  
159Chapter 5 Aa 9 and 16A of SADC Treaty (1992).  
160Article 21 of SADC Treaty (1992). 
161Article 24 of SADC Treaty (1992). 
162Chapter 9 Aa 25-27 and Chapter 10 Aa 28-30 of SADC Treaty (1992).  
163Article 32 of SADC Treaty (1992). 
164Chapter 13 Aa 33-35 of SADC Treaty (1992).  
165Saurombe A ‘The Role of SADC Institutions in Implementing SADC Treaty Provisions Dealing with 
Regional Integration’ (2012) 15 2 PER/PELJ 454 457.  
166Jakobeit C, Hartzenberg T and Charalambides N Overlapping Membership in COMESA, EAC, 
SACU and SADC: Trade Policy Options for the Region and for EPA Negotiations - Summary of 
Findings 2005 available at:www.acp-eutrade (accessed 4th October 2016) 12. 
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The principle organs of SADC will now be identified and their functions discussed in 
turn.  
 
i. The Summit:167 
The Summit is made up of the Heads of State of all member countries of SADC, 
and is responsible for overall policy-making and control of functions of SADC.168 
As such, it has a critical role to play in economic integration within the region, 
and meets once a year.  
The SADC Treaty169 obligates its member states to adopt legal instruments for 
the implementation of the provisions of the Treaty. However, the Treaty is silent 
on whether the decisions of the Summit have a direct effect on member 
states.170 The implementation of such decisions is, in fact, left to the discretion 
of the affected member state – a vague formulation that undermines the legal 
certainties that are necessary in the pursuit of economic integration.171 
As a brief explanation, the direct effect principle is derived from European Union 
law, which simply means that European Union law confers rights and imposes 
obligations directly, not only on the European Union institutions and the 
Member States, but also on the European Union’s individual citizens.172  
The direct effect principle therefore ensures the application and effectiveness of 
European Union law in the Member States.173 
Furthermore, the Summit is required to make all of its decisions on consensus 
only,174 whilst there are no provisions made for the event that consensus is not 
reached. As a result, decisions are made by consensus that is ‘manufactured’ 
                                                          
167Article 10 of SADC Treaty (1992).  
168Ng’ong’ola C ‘Regional Integration and Trade Liberalisation in Africa: The Treaty for the 
Establishment of an African Economic Community Revisited in the Context of the WTO System’ 
(1999) Journal of World Trade 485 506.  
169Article 22(1) of SADC Treaty (1992).  
170Saurombe A ‘The Role of SADC Institutions in Implementing SADC Treaty Provisions Dealing with 
Regional Integration’ (2012) 15 2 PER/PELJ 454 461. 
171Erasmus G ‘What has Happened to the Protection of Rights in SADC?’ (2012) 3.  
172 Definition of Direct Effect available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/ (accessed 4th October 
2016). 
173Definition of Direct Effect available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/ (accessed 4th October 
2016).  
174Articles 10, 11 and 13 of SADC Treaty 1992.  
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through unclear structures and wide discretions that undermine the very nature 
of rules-based trade.175 
 
ii. The Troika 
A system that allows for expeditious implementation of decisions and provide 
policy direction during periods between regular SADC meetings, the Troika 
consists of the current Chair of the SADC?, the incoming Chair and the outgoing 
Chair, and it is intended to foster continuity within SADC.176 
It is easier to convene and thus meets more often that the Summit, whilst it 
remains closely linked to the Summit.177 However, the hindrances that affect 
the Summit (discussed above) extend to the Troika in that its decisions must 
be endorsed and can thus be nullified in the absence of consensus.  
 
iii. The Council of Ministers178 
Generally speaking, the Council serves as the core driving force of SADC, 
developing and implementing the plans of SADC.179 
It consists of ministers of each member state,180 and oversees the functioning 
and development of SADC.181 It also serves as an advisory body to the Summit, 
but is hamstrung by the need to report its actions to the Summit as well. This 
erodes its ability to make significant progress with SADC policies and 
agenda.182  
 
 
 
                                                          
175Saurombe A ‘The Role of SADC Institutions in Implementing SADC Treaty Provisions Dealing with 
Regional Integration’ (2012) 15 2 PER/PELJ 454 462.  
176Erasmus G ‘What has Happened to the Protection of Rights in SADC?’ (2012) 3.  
177Saurombe A ‘The Role of SADC Institutions in Implementing SADC Treaty Provisions Dealing with 
Regional Integration’ (2012) 15 2 PER/PELJ 454 463.  
178Article 11 of SADC Treaty (1992).  
179Afadameh-Adeyemi A and Kalula E ‘SADC at 30: Re-examining the Legal and Institutional 
Anatomy of the Southern African Development Community’ (2010) Monitoring Regional Integration in 
Southern Africa: Yearbook 5.  
180Usually from the ministries of Foreign Affairs; Finance; Commerce.  
181Saurombe A ‘The Role of SADC Institutions in Implementing SADC Treaty Provisions Dealing with 
Regional Integration’ (2012) 15 2 PER/PELJ 454 464.  
182Afadameh-Adeyemi A and Kalula E ‘SADC at 30: Re-examining the Legal and Institutional 
Anatomy of the Southern African Development Community’ (2010) Monitoring Regional Integration in 
Southern Africa: Yearbook 5. 
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iv. The Integrated Committee of Ministers 
The integrated Committee is made up of at least two ministers from each 
member state, and functions as the ‘initiator’ of influencing policies on 
integration in the region in that the Committee first highlights the policies to be 
pursued which are then tabled for discussion among the higher institutions (the 
Council of Ministers; the Summit etc.)183 
 
v. The Standing Committee184 of Officials 
The Standing Committee serves as a technical advisory committee to the 
Council, whose representative in each of the member states serves as a 
contact point for SADC within that country. The main function of the Committee 
is to process documentation from the Integrated Committee and report to the 
Council.185 
 
vi. The SADC Tribunal186 
The Tribunal was constituted to ensure adherence to the proper interpretation 
of the provisions of the SADC Treaty and subsidiary instruments, and to 
adjudicate such disputes as may be referred to it.187 Furthermore, if the 
interpretation of the SADC Treaty is in dispute, the Tribunal should be an 
independent forum with the duty to rule on the correct interpretation (and as a 
result, the application of whatever applicable legal instrument) thereof.188 
 
However, although the Tribunal has the authority to place sanctions on member 
states repeatedly defaulting on any obligation in terms of the SADC Treaty, 
such sanctions can only be imposed by the Summit189 and the limitations of the 
consensus-based nature of the Summit has already been discussed.  
 
                                                          
183Article 12 of SADC Treaty (1992).  
184Article 13 of SADC Treaty (1992).  
185Saurombe A ‘The Role of SADC Institutions in Implementing SADC Treaty Provisions Dealing with 
Regional Integration’ (2012) 15 2 PER/PELJ 454 467.  
186Article 16 of SADC Treaty (1992).  
187Article 16(1) of SADC Treaty (1992).  
188Erasmus G ‘What has Happened to the Protection of Rights in SADC?’ (2012) 130. 
189Article 33.2 of SADC Treaty (1992).  
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The Tribunal is currently not operational due to a decision to suspend it by the 
2010 Windhoek Forum. Subsequent to the ruling of the SADC Tribunal in the 
case of Campbell and Others v Zimbabwe,190  (which was not to the liking of 
Zimbabwe) Zimbabwe commenced a lobbying campaign to convince Southern 
African leaders to disband the Tribunal.191  
As a result, on the 17th August, 2010, SADC leadership capitulated ordering a 
review of the "role, function and terms of reference of the Tribunal."192 During 
the review process, the Tribunal was provisionally suspended, and in August 
2012, it was stripped of its jurisdiction to hear individual human rights claims, 
relegating it to disputes between nation-states.193  
 
vii. The Secretariat194 
The Secretariat is the institution responsible for strategic planning, co-
ordination and management of SADC programmes, headed by an Executive 
Secretary stationed in Gaborone, Botswana.195 
It is also tasked with implementing decisions of the Summit and the Council, as 
well as arranging and managing the SADC meetings.196 Additionally, the 
Secretariat represents SADC at regional and multilateral levels in respect of 
trade negotiations.  
The biggest challenge facing the Secretariat at this stage has been said to be 
the reluctance of member states to surrender national initiative and active 
representation to the principle of supra-nationalism.197 
 
 
                                                          
190Campbell and Others v Zimbabwe (Merits), Case No SADC (T) 2/2007.  
191 Caesar Zvayi, Zim Wants SADC Tribunal Rulings Nullified (May 19, 2011) available at 
http://www.herald.co.zw/zim-wants-sadc-tribunal-rulings-nullified/ (accessed 12th October 2016). 
192 Cohen D ‘A President, An International Tribunal And A Band Of Farmers Walk Into A Constitutional 
Court-The Last Laugh: Mike Campbell V. The Government Of The Republic Of Zimbabwe(2012) 39.  
193 Editorial, Re-Empower SADC Tribunal, MAIL & GUARDIAN, June 28, 2013, available at 
http://mg.co.za/article/ 
2013-06-28-editorial-re-empower-sadc-tribunal ("Justice can come wrapped in cruel irony.") 
(accessed 12th October 2016). 
194Article 14 of SADC Treaty (1992).  
195Article 2.2 of SADC Treaty (1992).  
196Article 14.1.3 of SADC Treaty (1992).  
197Evans D, Holmes P and Mandaza I ‘SADC: The Cost of Non-integration’ (1999).  
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3.3 Problems Facing SADC 
 
There are a number of immediately apparent issues evident within the current 
structure and functioning of SADC. Chief among them is the resistance to 
supranational institutions198 and the resultant encroachment on their sovereignty 
mentioned earlier, which has been argued to be a direct obstacle to deep integration 
in the region.199 
 
Furthermore, it has been submitted that economic integration requires, on a 
fundamental level, the delegation of power to a supranational body tasked with 
protecting the supranational institution as well as the individual member states.200 
 
It is clear thus that SADC is a very ambitious model on paper, but there is a poor record 
with regards to implementation due to the legal uncertainties referred to above.201 
 
3.4 SADC Regulatory Framework 
 
It is necessary, at this point, to delve into the manner in which SADC’s regulatory 
framework currently operates, as the subject matter of this paper seeks to establish 
the viability of some form of uniform corporate governance framework within the 
region.  
 
i. The SADC Protocol 
A Protocol is a legally binding document committing the SADC states to the 
objectives and specific procedures stated within it.202 It requires a two thirds of 
the member states to ratify or sign the agreement, thereby giving formal 
consent, to have it enter into force.203 A provision for any disputes arising from 
the application or interpretation of a Protocol is made by referring grievances to 
                                                          
198Supranational Institutions are independent of member states and have decision-making powers 
that bind member states.  
199Mattli W ‘The Logic of Regional Integration: Europe and Beyond’ (1999) 3.  
200Mutharika B ‘Towards Multinational Economic Cooperation in Africa’ (1972) 31.  
201Erasmus G ‘Is the SADC Trade Regime a Rules-based System?’ (2011) SADC Law Journal 130.  
202 SADC Protocols available at http://www.sadc.int/about-sadc/overview/sa-protocols/(accessed 11th 
October 2016). 
203 Article 36 of SADC Treaty (1992).  
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the SADC Tribunal if they cannot be resolved amicably through regular 
diplomatic channels.204 However, the challenge this brings about is the non-
functionality of the SADC Tribunal due to its suspension subsequent to the 
matter of Campbell and Others v Zimbabwe,205 as discussed herein above. 
Accordingly, there is in effect no enforcement mechanism currently in place to 
ensure adherence to the Protocol.  
 
ii. The SADC Model Law 
A model law is not binding on member states, but seeks to provide a hoped-for 
standard (a ‘model’) to be aspired to by member states’ domestic legislation. 
By way of an illustration, the SADC Model Law on HIV and AIDS in Southern 
Africa contains significant direction in the fight against the HIV pandemic in 
Southern Africa and directs the member states to adopt domestic legislation 
that furthers the spirit of this model law.206 Furthermore, SADC Model laws are 
intended to be used as a yardstick for member states’ review and reform of 
related domestic legislation.207  
 
3.5 Conclusion 
 
In summary, the aforementioned is argued to be part of the reason why SADC has not 
made the desired progress in its objective of facilitating economic growth and 
integration.208 A regional development community such as SADC cannot be expected 
to meet its objectives in achieving integration and stimulating economic growth and 
development if, for instance, its own adjudicatory body is defunct (as is the case with 
the Tribunal).  
 
                                                          
204 SADC Protocols available at http://www.sadc.int/about-sadc/overview/sa-protocols/(accessed 11th 
October 2016). 
205Campbell and Others v Zimbabwe (Merits), Case No SADC (T) 2/2007.  
206 Section 2 Model Law on HIV & AIDS in Southern Africa (2008).  
207 Preamble Model Law on HIV & AIDS in Southern Africa (2008).  
208Saurombe A ‘The Role of SADC Institutions in Implementing SADC Treaty Provisions Dealing with 
Regional Integration’ (2012) 15 2 PER/PELJ 454 475.  
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Furthermore, it has already been submitted that proper economic integration is not 
possible under a decentralised institution as is currently in effect.209 It has been argued 
that SADC, at this point in time, has failed to effectively fulfil its objectives and, as 
alluded to in chapter 1, is in need of some form of assistance to make its desired 
progress.  
 
The following chapter will examine the proposed corporate governance regime in the 
pursuit of economic integration.  
 
  
                                                          
209Saurombe A ‘The Role of SADC Institutions in Implementing SADC Treaty Provisions Dealing with 
Regional Integration’ (2012) 15 2 PER/PELJ 454 458.  
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CHAPTER FOUR  
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF A UNIFORM CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REGIME 
FOR SADC 
 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter will endeavour to explore the actual application of a uniform corporate 
governance regime and, together with the information presented in the aforegoing 
chapters, conceptualise a form thereof for implementation within SADC.  
It may be useful, at this stage, to recap the concept that is being discussed in this 
paper. Corporate governance, both as an academic discipline and as a business 
practice, is a tool to deal with the challenges and complexities of business 
behaviour.210 In the words of one respected author, corporate governance is 
concerned with the ‘exercise of power over corporate entities’.211 
 
4.2  The Company Board  
It will be prudent, at this juncture, to examine the practical workings of implementing 
and maintaining a corporate governance regime. Corporate governance, it has been 
submitted, is traditionally within the purview of the company board as it is this institution 
that is responsible for the leadership and accountability of companies which, as 
already stated, is among the fundamental aspects of corporate governance.212 
It has furthermore been argued that compliant company boards protect the interests 
of the owners, or shareholders, in overseeing the conduct of company executives, and 
the hope is that they will ensure good care of the company by these individuals running 
it on a day-to-day basis.213  
 
                                                          
210Corrigan T Getting Down to Business: Lessons from the African Peer Review Mechanism (2014) 7.  
211Tricker B ‘Corporate Governance: Principles, Policies and Practices’ (2011) 29.  
212 Corrigan T Getting Down to Business: Lessons from the African Peer Review Mechanism (2014) 
39. 
213 Corrigan T Getting Down to Business: Lessons from the African Peer Review Mechanism (2014) 
39. 
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It is trite that, speaking from a SADC point of view, compliance with the concept of 
corporate governance rests heavily on self-regulation and as such company boards 
have a considerable obligation to not only ensure compliance with both the law and 
best practice, and protect the interests of their shareholders, but they also have to 
carry the burden of seeing to it that the corporate governance regime is acceptable to 
all of the various stakeholders.214  
The strategic importance of company boards was established in the corporate 
governance agenda by the seminal Cadbury Report,215 whose Code of Best Practice 
deals principally with board structure and responsibilities.216 
The Cadbury Report has to a large degree been overtaken by the ‘stakeholder-
responsible’ or ‘stakeholder inclusive’ approach engendered by the King Report on 
Corporate Governance for South Africa – particularly in South Africa and on the continent 
as a whole. The King Report on Corporate Governance for South Africa has also 
emphasised the importance of non-executive directors. It states that: 
“The non-executive director plays an important role in providing objective 
judgement independent of management on issues facing the company. Not 
being involved in the management of the company defines the director as non-
executive. Non-executive directors are independent of management on all 
issues including strategy, performance, sustainability, resources, 
transformation, diversity, employment equity, standards of conduct and 
evaluation of performance. The non-executive directors should meet from time 
to time without the executive directors to consider the performance and actions 
of executive management.217” 
In light of the recent emphasis on non-shareholder interests as espoused by the King 
Report on Corporate Governance for South Africa, company boards will be playing an 
increasingly vital role in ensuring that the interests of stakeholders other than 
                                                          
214 Corrigan T Getting Down to Business: Lessons from the African Peer Review Mechanism (2014) 
39.  
215Report of the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance (Sir Adrian Cadbury, 
Chair)(1992).  
216 Corrigan T Getting Down to Business: Lessons from the African Peer Review Mechanism (2014) 
39.  
217King Report on Corporate Governance for South Africa (3rdreport), 2009, Annex 2.3. 
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shareholders are also adequately protected.218 Indeed, stakeholder inclusivity forms 
part of the foundation of King IV, in terms of which the legitimate and reasonable 
needs, interests and expectations of all material stakeholders must be taken into 
account by the company.219 
 
4.3 State-Owned Enterprises (‘SOEs’) 
It is a known fact that SOEs are an important part of many economies across the world 
and it has indeed been submitted in this paper that they are of particular importance 
to the economies within SADC, and from a corporate governance perspective, SOEs 
are first and foremost companies like any other. They are as susceptible to faults and 
non-compliance with legislation as their equivalents in the private sector.220 Their 
compliance with a form of corporate governance regime is therefore necessary. The 
Principles for Corporate Governance in the Commonwealth succinctly makes the 
following point:  
“In emerging and transition economies, the main or substantive commercial 
activity usually rests with the state enterprises. These enterprises often 
constitute the primary (and sometimes only) customer or supplier on whom an 
emerging private sector activity may depend. With the emphasis on 
encouraging the development of small, micro and medium enterprises, this has 
significant economic consequences. The conduct and efficacy of state 
enterprises can, therefore, act as a ‘driver’ of good corporate governance 
practices in ensuring that this permeates through to an emergent private 
sector.221” 
Furthermore, the OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance of State Owned 
Enterprises is clear that SOE boards should act in the best interests of the entities they 
control, exercise independent judgement and treat all stakeholders equitably.222 In 
                                                          
218 Corrigan T Getting Down to Business: Lessons from the African Peer Review Mechanism (2014) 
40.  
219 King Report on Corporate Governance for South Africa (4th report), 2016, 4. 
220 For an illustration, see Vecchiatto P, ‘Eskom’s bad record on environment “worrying”’, Business 
Day, 23 November 2012, available at http://www.bdlive.co.za/national/science/2012/11/23/eskoms-
bad-record -on-environment-worrying.   
221 Commonwealth Association for Corporate Governance, Principles for Corporate Governance in the 
Commonwealth, 1999. 
222 OECD, Guidelines on Corporate Governance of State-Owned Enterprises. Paris: OECD, 2005.  
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addition thereto and as mentioned in chapter 2, the King Report on Corporate 
Governance for South Africa IV (‘King IV’) includes a supplement relating specifically 
to state-owned enterprises, which requires that state-owned enterprises should 
establish and ethical culture and foster responsible corporate citizenship.223 
 
4.4 The Comparative Study 
The remainder of this chapter will, as indicated, attempt to interrogate the concept of 
employing a uniform corporate governance regime within SADC and, as referred to in 
chapter two, the use of a comparative study will look at the King Report on Corporate 
Governance for South Africa, as well as the OECD Principles on Corporate 
Governance due to, inter alia, its cross-border application within its member countries, 
as well as non-member countries. Much of what is discussed here has been touched 
on in chapter two but will be dealt with in greater detail at this stage.  
 
4.4.1 The King Code of Governance Principles (‘King III and King IV’) 
The King Committee was formed under the auspices of the Institute of Directors of 
Southern Africa in 1992.224 The purpose of the King Reports is, as mentioned in 
Chapter one, to promote the highest standards of corporate governance in South 
Africa.225 As such, the elements and principles as outlined in the King Report on 
Corporate Governance for South Africa are considered to be at the forefront of 
international trends and best practices. Indeed, the King Report on Corporate 
Governance for South Africa has placed South Africa at the forefront of governance 
worldwide, making it a global leader in the field of corporate governance and in effect 
becoming the benchmark.226  
 
Due to the fact that King IV has very recently been published and is due to be 
implemented from 1 April 2017, there is predictably fairly few academic articles 
                                                          
223 The King Report on Corporate Governance for South Africa (4th report) 2016 Part 6.6. 
224 Naidoo R Corporate Governance 2 ed (2009) 32.  
225Le Roux F The Applicability of the Third King Report on Corporate Governance to Small and 
Medium Enterprises (Masters of Business Administration Research Report, University of Stellenbosch 
(2010) 24.  
226Engelbrecht, L. ‘King III code: comply vs. apply, what’s the difference’ (2009) Occupational Risk 
Management Volume 5, Issue 6.  
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published in respect thereof. Nonetheless, the principles of King III (as they are 
currently formulated and still in effect) remain relevant and worthy of scrutiny. 
However, the major differences between it and King IV will be discussed.  
As mentioned previously in Chapter two, the King Report on Corporate Governance for 
South Africa revolves around ethical leadership, sustainability and corporate 
citizenship. Corporate citizenship and social responsibility, it has been argued, is about 
the integration of social and environmental considerations into the core focus of a 
company so that the existence of those companies will be sustainable in more than 
just financial terms.227 King III also states that the advent of integrated reports 
increases the trust and confidence of stakeholders in a company and the acceptability 
of its operations,228 thereby increasing business opportunities and improving the 
effectiveness of the company’s risk management.229 
The reality of corporate governance is that boards must take account of financial 
capital provided by shareholders, human capital from employees, natural capital 
provided by land, air and water and social capital provided by the community and 
society in which the company operates.230 
One of the critical principles outlined in King III with reference to board and directors, 
is that the board and its directors should act in the best interest of the company.231 
In particular, King III places significant emphasis on the separation of the role of the 
CEO and the Chairperson. The application of this principle is considered international 
best practice232 and helps to promote a balance of power within the leadership 
structure to avoid the situation where one single individual has unrestricted control of 
the company.233  
                                                          
227 Naidoo R Corporate Governance 2 ed (2009) 126. 
228 King III 13.  
229Le Roux F The Applicability of the Third King Report on Corporate Governance to Small and 
Medium Enterprises (Masters of Business Administration Research Report, University of Stellenbosch 
2010) 31.  
230King, M Corporate governance: individuals emerge as chief providers of capital. Business Report, 
18 August 2009 14.  
231Le Roux F The Applicability of the Third King Report on Corporate Governance to Small and 
Medium Enterprises (Masters of Business Administration Research Report, University of Stellenbosch 
2010) 26.  
232 United Nations. 2006. Guidance on good practices in corporate governance disclosure. New York 
& Geneva: United Nations Publications 12. 
233Le Roux F The Applicability of the Third King Report on Corporate Governance to Small and 
Medium Enterprises (Masters of Business Administration Research Report, University of Stellenbosch 
2010) 27.  
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It has been furthermore submitted that good governance will not result from mindless 
compliance with a governance code or rules, but rather from ‘abstract’ concepts such 
as fairness, accountability, responsibility and transparency on a foundation of 
intellectual honesty.234 King III is in essence about the building of an ethical culture 
within the corporate world and not just about the mechanical ticking off of duties and 
processes.235 
King III is principles-based, not legislated and thus follows the ‘apply and explain’ 
principle.236 Although compliance with King III is voluntary, it is a requirement for listing 
on the Johannesburg Securities Exchange (‘JSE’), which gives it a degree of weight, 
as it were.  
There is, as can be expected, a substantial debate about the merits of this approach, 
or whether a legislated approach would be better.237 By comparison, as mentioned in 
Chapter two, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, aimed at imposing legally enforceable 
corporate governance standards on the business sector, imposes significant 
compliance costs, and as compliance requirements tend to affect smaller businesses 
harder, they can have a particularly severe impact on ambitious entrepreneurs and on 
the sector of the economy most likely to create employment.238 It is submitted that a 
system that makes provision for this, and allows for the flexibility characteristic of a 
voluntary (as opposed to a legislated) approach, can address this problem. 
 
The King III report makes the following prudent point: 
“There is an important argument against the ‘comply or else’ regime: a ‘one size 
fits all’ approach cannot logically be suitable because the types of business 
carried out by companies vary to such a large degree. The cost of compliance 
is burdensome, measured both in terms of time and direct cost. Further, the 
danger is that the board and management may become focused on compliance 
                                                          
234 King M The Corporate Citizen (2006) 15.  
235Visser, C.B. 2009. Corporate governance and the new King III report. Southern Business School 
available at http://www.sbsonline.info/essays-and-other-opinion-pieces(accessed 13th October 2016).  
236Wiese T Corporate Governance in South Africa: With International Comparisons (2014) 21. 
237 South Africa Country Review Report APRM Programme 2014 161.  
238 Corrigan T Getting Down to Business: Lessons from the African Peer Review Mechanism (2014) 
34. 
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at the expense of enterprise. It is the duty of the board of a trading enterprise 
to undertake a measure of risk for reward and to try to improve the economic 
value of a company. If the board has a focus on compliance, the attention on 
its ultimate responsibility, namely performance, may be diluted.”239 
The major differences to King IV can be explained as follows: 240   
i. King III required companies to apply or explain insofar as the principles 
were concerned, King IV assumes application of all principles, and 
requires entities to explain how the principles are applied. This is referred 
to as the ‘apply and explain’ philosophy;  
ii. King IV is streamlined to include 16 consolidated principles, as opposed 
to the 75 principles of King III;  
iii. King IV is principle and outcomes based, as opposed to rules based;  
iv. Remuneration of directors has a more prominent role (although it merely 
requires a non-binding advisory vote of shareholders);  
v. King IV recognises information in isolation of technology as a corporate 
asset that is part of the company’s stock of intellectual capital and 
confirms the need for governance structures to protect and enhance this 
asset;  
vi. King IV requires active stakeholders to hold the Board to account for their 
actions and disclosures;  
 
vii. The governance framework of the company must be agreed upon and 
implemented by the company board, and not by any subsidiary boards 
(as was the case with King III);  
 
vii. King IV contains a number of sector supplements, designed to assist in 
the interpretation and application of the principles across a number of 
contexts, situations and legislative regimes, which allows for a degree of 
                                                          
239Institute of Directors of Southern Africa and King Committee, King Report on Governance for South 
Africa (3rdreport), (2009) 4.  
240 Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu Limited report on King IV (2016).  
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flexibility. This concept evokes the image of an accordion in that the 
principles can be ‘stretched and squeezed’ to adapt to particular 
challenges.  
It has been posited that the advantage of principles over rules, is that principles are 
easy to understand but are not rigidly defined (as rules are) and that principles relate 
to individual behaviour in order to shape group behaviour, whereas rules are 
indistinguishable.241 Furthermore, principles can achieve widespread acceptance, 
whereas rules are invariably specific to a given group at a certain point in time. 
A model incorporating the flexibilities of the approach of the King Report on Corporate 
Governance for South Africa, it is submitted, is probably the most suitable approach for 
the region. Effective corporate governance is manifested by its principles, not on its 
rigid policing.242 This approach provides a suitable foundation for proper, robust and 
meaningful corporate governance, which should pervade throughout companies’ 
activities.243  
 
 4.4.2 The OECD principles on corporate governance 
 
As stated previously, the OECD principles on corporate governance will be looked at 
as a benchmark, due to its international dimension, so to speak, and its impact on non-
member countries as well. Furthermore, these principles are considered to be the 
international touchstone for corporate governance due to it having successfully 
initiated a number of changes, both by governments and the private sector.244 
Accordingly, both the general principles and principles for state-owned enterprises will 
be examined.  
 
A factor to be considered, and alluded to in chapter three, is the applicability of these 
principles on non-member countries. In addition to the OECD Network on Corporate 
                                                          
241 Le Roux F The Applicability of the Third King Report on Corporate Governance to Small and 
Medium Enterprises (Masters of Business Administration Research Report, University of Stellenbosch 
2010).  
242Corrigan T Getting Down to Business: Lessons from the African Peer Review Mechanism (2014) 
34. 
243 Corrigan T Getting Down to Business: Lessons from the African Peer Review Mechanism (2014) 
34. 
244Jesover F, Kirkpatrick G ‘The Revised OECD Principles of Corporate Governance and their 
Relevance to Non-OECD Countries’ Corporate Governance: an International Review January 2005 2.  
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Governance of State-Owned Enterprises in Southern Africa, the OECD has organised 
meetings of the Regional Corporate Governance Roundtables in 18 countries, which 
involved consultations with non-member countries and were first held in Asia, Europe, 
Latin America, Russia and Southeast Europe.245  
 
These Roundtables have spawned a great deal of information and recognised key 
aspects of corporate governance that are of particular importance to developing and 
emerging economies.246 This information will be of invaluable assistance in the pursuit 
of engendering an environment of compliance within the region, and together with the 
work of the OECD Network on Corporate Governance of State-Owned Enterprises in 
Southern Africa illustrates the value that the OECD adds as a corporate governance 
authority internationally.  
 
Further credence can be given to the OECD principles on corporate governance due 
to its influential status among other international corporate governance authorities. In 
amplification of the aforesaid, consider the impact it has had on formulation of The 
International Corporate Governance Network Corporate (ICGN) Global Governance 
Principles.  
 
The ICGN's mission is to inspire and advocate effective standards of corporate 
governance to promote efficient markets and economies world-wide.247 This is 
achieved through influencing policy by providing a reliable source of practical 
knowledge and experiences on high standards of corporate governance; allowing for 
communication among peers to provide a forum for dialogue between companies, 
investors and other stakeholders; and informing knowledge through guidance and 
education to stimulate awareness and discourse among members.248  
 
Illustrating the mutually-symbiotic relationship between the OECD and the ICGN is the 
fact that the ICGN was a key player in the formulation of the OECD principles of 
                                                          
245Jesover F, Kirkpatrick G ‘The Revised OECD Principles of Corporate Governance and their 
Relevance to Non-OECD Countries’ Corporate Governance: an International Review January 2005 5. 
246Robinett D et al ‘Experiences from the Regional Corporate Governance Roundtables’ (2003) 
available at http://www.oecd.org/daf/ca/corporategovernanceprinciples/23742340.pdf(accessed 11th 
October 2016).  
247 About ICGN available at https://www.icgn.org/about(accessed 11th October 2016).  
248 About ICGN available at https://www.icgn.org/about(accessed 11th October 2016). 
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corporate governance, as well as the fact that many members of the OECD’s Ad Hoc 
Taskforce on Corporate Governance referenced the principles of the ICGN.249  
 
Further illustrating the point is the fact that the ICGN have rated the OECD principles 
as a prime example of minimum best practice standards for companies and investors 
from an international point of view.250The ICGN further has recommended the OECD 
Principles as a significant achievement of corporate governance common ground 
among varied interests, practices and cultures.251  
 
Accordingly, the OECD principles can be used as a point of departure, with the 
principles of King IV being used to flesh out aspects that are not explicitly covered 
therein.  
 
4.5 Proposed Solution 
 
As mentioned previously, this paper seeks to determine the feasibility of implementing 
a uniform corporate governance regime among SADC member states, in the pursuit 
of deep economic integration (it being one of SADC’s primary goals).  
 
In light of the foregoing submissions, it is proposed that SADC model a corporate 
governance regime based on the OECD principles of corporate governance. 
Simultaneously, it would be imprudent to ignore the benefits of incorporating aspects 
of the King Report on Corporate Governance for South Africa, owing largely to its 
international status as a pioneering work in the field of corporate governance. The 
King Report on Corporate Governance for South Africa’s flexibility via the ‘apply and 
explain’ principle is highly desirous in this respect, particularly owing to SADC member 
states’ fiercely protective nature described in Chapter three.  
 
The manner of implementing a uniform corporate governance regime in SADC, within 
SADC’s existing architecture is somewhat complex. The obvious point of departure 
                                                          
249Mallin C Corporate Governance 4th edition (2013) 45. 
250 International Corporate Governance Network Statement on Global Corporate Governance 
Principles (1999).  
251Mallin C Corporate Governance 4th edition (2013) 45. 
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would be to promulgate a Protocol on the principles of corporate governance within 
SADC.  
 
An immediate complication is the fact that corporate governance disputes will not often 
be among nation states. In fact, this will very rarely be the case, and as such there will 
be no recourse for affected stakeholders in the event of a breach of the protocol. The 
reason for this has been discussed in chapter three. Accordingly, without a means of 
enforcement, a SADC protocol seems an unworkable concept.  
 
An alternative to the SADC Protocol, would be the use of a so-called ‘SADC Model 
Law’, which, it is submitted, is a lesser known route but carries with it its own significant 
merits. The details of the concept of a SADC Model Law has been discussed in chapter 
three.  
 
It is submitted that the approach of a SADC Model Law is most suited to the challenge 
of reforming corporate governance in the SADC region and implementing a uniform 
regime. It must be noted that the OECD Principles on Corporate governance are 
extremely similar in their nature to the concept of a SADC Model law and has a track 
record of success. Particularly in light of the hindrances facing the SADC Tribunal and 
the resultant lack of prospects of a SADC Protocol, a SADC Model law as a template 
for the member states to aspire to is perhaps the most apt approach. This would be in 
keeping with the desired flexibility and absence of encroachment on the sovereignty 
of the member states.  
 
The fact that these principles are non-binding and do not require signing into law (as 
a starting point) brings with it the benefit that is manifest in the absence of the politics 
that come with treaties and conventions. A simple cursory examination will attest to 
the reality that SADC member states have a propensity for insubordination in respect 
of their own treaties.252  
 
                                                          
252 Reference is here made to the case of Campbell and Others v Zimbabwe (Merits), Case No SADC 
(T) 2/2007. 
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Consequently, there is no reason to resolutely believe and rely on the prospect that 
they would respect their own laws on corporate governance. Thus, the advantage of 
these type of non-binding principles is that there is a prospect that they will be 
accepted due to the fact that they do not encroach on the sovereignty of the 
membership which has proven to be sacrosanct to the member states and resultantly 
has been one of the problems facing economic integration in the region.  
 
Furthermore, as stated earlier, the OECD Principles on Corporate Governance are 
recognised for the fact that they establish and exploit a mutuality, as it were, among 
varied practices in their member states.253 This indicates that an approach modelled 
on the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance would also cater for the varied legal 
systems prevalent among SADC member states.  
 
In amplification of the aforesaid, the current thinking on corporate governance 
increasingly recognises that the intersection of legal, political and cultural factors 
combine to produce the unique ‘version’ of corporate governance that emerges in any 
given setting.254 For example, in Asia, the prominence of family-owned businesses 
and the Confucian tradition255 raise the importance of familial relationships and 
hierarchy in this part of the world – with corresponding implications, for good and bad, 
for corporate governance in these economies.256 Appeals have been made in Africa 
for corporate governance to be conceptualised around its own cultural frameworks 
and economic context.257 Accordingly, a corporate governance regime in the region 
will require to take proper cognisance of these factors and be tailored accordingly.  
 
Bearing the above in mind, with the implementation of a corporate governance regime 
modelled on the OECD principles of corporate governance, an environment of 
predictability (insofar as the corporate governance practices are concerned) will 
become apparent in the region, which is paramount in the pursuit of investor interest.  
 
                                                          
253Mallin C Corporate Governance 4th edition (2013) 45.  
254 Corrigan T Getting Down to Business: Lessons from the African Peer Review Mechanism (2014) 
72. 
255Tricker B ‘Corporate Governance: Principles, Policies and Practices’ (2011) 162. 
256 Corrigan T Getting Down to Business: Lessons from the African Peer Review Mechanism (2014) 
72.  
257 Avoiding the dinosaur trap’, The Economist, (31 May 2014), p 9–13.  
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4.6 Possible Challenges to the Proposed Solution  
 
It is submitted that it is necessary to briefly examine the criticisms of implementing a 
corporate governance regime based on the OECD principles of corporate governance, 
if only to provide a balanced view of the concept.  
 
It has been submitted that the OECD principles on corporate governance are based 
on a common understanding of its member countries.258There would be increasing 
issues of compatibility with SADC countries as these countries have, as alluded to in 
Chapter Three, a large secondary economy made up of the informal sector259 and 
includes family firms-governance, corruption and the tricks to veil or obscure the 
transparency and accountability assumed as the basis of the Principles for the leading 
OECD countries.260  
 
The difficulties and failings in implementing corporate governance regimes cannot be 
separated from the general challenges in the business environment as a whole. 
Corporate governance in the formal sector, to the extent that it requires formal 
compliance, carries with it considerable costs and as a more sophisticated business 
sector emerges, and as governments ramp up the effectiveness with which they 
operate an ever-more effective system of corporate governance will need to 
emerge.261  
 
4.7 Conclusion 
 
Thus, it is submitted that the OECD principles of governance may not be a perfect fit 
for the region, but it does provide an extremely useful touchstone in the pursuit of the 
concept of a uniform corporate governance regime. As mentioned previously, it could 
                                                          
258Siems M and Alvarez-Macotela O F ‘The OECD Principles of Corporate Governance in Emerging 
Markets: A successful example of networked governance?’ Networked Governance, Transnational 
Business and the Law (2014) 20.  
259Corrigan T Getting Down to Business: Lessons from the African Peer Review Mechanism (2014) 
17.  
260Siems M and Alvarez-Macotela O F ‘The OECD Principles of Corporate Governance in Emerging 
Markets: A successful example of networked governance?’ Networked Governance, Transnational 
Business and the Law (2014) 20.  
261 Corrigan T Getting Down to Business: Lessons from the African Peer Review Mechanism (2014) 
38. 
 
 
 
 
60 
 
conceivably be amalgamated with key characteristics of the King Report on Corporate 
Governance for South Africa, for a balanced and workable solution.  
 
Perhaps the lead of King IV can be followed, whereby a SADC Model Law on 
Corporate Governance is devised which encompasses the essential objectives of a 
sound corporate governance regime as espoused in chapters one and two, with sector 
supplements that address the specific challenges of the state-owned sector262 and the 
various informal economies within the member states, amongst others.  
 
SADC’s circumstances, therefore, impose severe challenges. In the greater scheme 
of the pursuit of deeper economic integration, these are amplified by the aim to do 
things according to global best practice.263 Striving for best practice demands that, as 
SADC builds and improves its corporate governance architecture, it limits any 
tendencies of cultural essentialism.264 As a recent report on Asian business in The 
Economist observed, successful Asian companies are consolidating themselves by 
acknowledging their weaknesses and drawing on the experiences of Western 
companies to upgrade their corporate governance.265  
 
The following quote was found to be apt for the conclusion of this Chapter:  
 
‘For business to prosper in the African environment, a number of things will have to be 
put right. Among them are the implementation of corporate governance standards, 
including the timely provision of information to investors; a clear separation of interests 
by executives; strongly enforced independent audit practices; and clear lines of 
responsibility for corporate leaders.’266  
 
The following chapter will present a summary of the information discussed and submit 
a recommendation thereto.  
                                                          
262 Which, as stated in chapter two, makes up the largest part of the economy in Southern Africa. 
263 Corrigan T Getting Down to Business: Lessons from the African Peer Review Mechanism (2014) 
72. 
264 Corrigan T Getting Down to Business: Lessons from the African Peer Review Mechanism (2014) 
72.  
265 One world’, The Economist, (31 May 2014), 40. 
266 Mills G, Poverty to Prosperity: Globalisation, Good Governance and African Recovery. Cape Town 
and Johannesburg: Tafelberg and SAIIA, (2002) 245–246. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
5.1 Introduction 
This paper has sought to illustrate the shortcomings of SADC in its pursuit of its stated 
objectives, specifically attracting investment and fostering economic development and 
integration. Furthermore, it has sought to demonstrate the link between a sound 
corporate governance regime and integration as well as posit various solutions to the 
aforementioned shortcomings via the mechanism of a uniform corporate governance 
regime.  
This chapter will review the conclusions reached in the aforegoing chapters and 
suggest the most ideal model for the implementation of such a uniform corporate 
governance regime.  
 
5.2 Corporate Governance as a Relevant Solution 
As submitted in chapter 2, the core of a sound corporate governance regime is 
concepts such as ethical leadership, sustainability, transparency and acting in the best 
interest of the stakeholders. These ideals are central to the theme of ‘good 
governance’ and the off-shoot hereof is the creation of a favourable investment climate 
which is necessary for attracting investment and growing the economy.267 
In addition to the aforesaid, the fact that foreign direct investment has been a major 
factor in the economic development and growth in the region268 must be borne in mind, 
as well as the fact that most foreign direct investment is aimed at the extraction of the 
abundant natural resources in the region.269 It is submitted that it is within this sphere 
                                                          
267OECD-SADC Policy Brief June 2015 available at http://www.oecd.org/dat/inv(accessed 25 
September 2016). 
268Corrigan T Getting Down to Business: Lessons from the African Peer Review Mechanism (2014) 
61. 
269Adeoye A Macroeconomic Level Corporate Governance and FDI in Emerging Markets: Is there a 
close relationship? (Masters of Management Science thesis, King’s College London, 2007) 13. 
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that corporate governance (with the emphasis it places on sustainability) becomes 
critically important.  
A further factor to consider is that state-owned enterprises are believed to make up 
the largest part of the economy in Southern Africa.270 It has been argued that the 
absence of a clear and operational corporate governance framework, as well as 
deficient infrastructure, corruption, and inadequately trained workforce within state-
owned enterprises are hindering the business environment within the SADC region.271 
Perhaps most presciently, SADC has been acknowledged as having failed in its 
objectives, due in large part to the presence of legal uncertainties in its very own 
constitutional framework272 and a resistance to the implementation of its own 
principles.273 
Accordingly, a robust corporate governance regime is precisely the correct antidote to 
the remedy some of the ills currently faced by SADC.  
 
5.3 Corporate Governance and Integration 
In support of the submission that a sound corporate governance regime will invariably 
result in the growth of the economies and facilitate integration within the SADC region, 
it has been argued that the member states’ economic growth is dependent on the 
businesses operating within them, which are in turn dependent on proper systems of 
regulation and governance.274 Simply put, a proper system of corporate governance 
will aid the success of businesses in the region, which in turn will aid in the 
development of the economy.  
Furthermore, it has been submitted that the promotion of economic integration within 
the region can only be achieved in the presence of sound corporate governance 
                                                          
270 Sultan Balbuena, S. (2014), “State-owned Enterprises in Southern Africa: A Stocktaking of 
Reforms and Challenges”, OECD Corporate Governance Working Papers OECD Publishing 7.  
271 Corrigan T Policy Briefing 101 ‘Building an African Corporate Governance’ August 2014. 
272Erasmus G ‘Is the SADC Trade Regime a Rules-based System?’ (2011) SADC Law Journal 130. 
273Saurombe A ‘The Role of SADC Institutions in Implementing SADC Treaty Provisions Dealing with 
Regional Integration’ (2012) 15 2 PER/PELJ 454 475. 
274Corrigan T Getting Down to Business: Lessons from the African Peer Review Mechanism (2014) 7. 
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structures.275 Indeed, it has been suggested that corporate governance is an essential 
component of building a culture of ethics and accountability, which is vital for the 
cultivation of a strong economy.276 
 
5.4 SADC Model Law on Corporate Governance  
Having regard for the above, as well as the salient features of the OECD principles on 
corporate governance and of the King Report on Corporate Governance for South 
Africa, it is submitted that the most appropriate route to take would be the devising 
and implementation of a SADC Model Law on Corporate Governance. The SADC 
Model Law is desirous due to its voluntary nature, and the fact that it sets a ‘hope for’ 
standard which domestic legislation should aspire to and is accordingly not a 
legislative burden on member states.277  
This Model Law would be fashioned along the lines of the OECD Principles on 
Corporate governance, whilst incorporating appropriate aspects of the King Report on 
Corporate Governance for South Africa. Of particular benefit in respect of following the 
example set by the OECD Principles on Corporate Governance is the fact that it is 
recognised for the fact that it establishes and exploits a mutuality, among varied 
practices in their member states,278 which is useful in light of the varied legal systems 
prevalent among SADC member states. Principles such as the ensuring of 
transparency and sustainability; protection of shareholder rights; clearly identifying the 
role of stakeholders; and board accountability would be logical inclusions in this Model 
Law.  
In addition, aspects of the King Report on Corporate Governance for South Africa can 
be incorporated into this Model Law, where the OECD Principles on Corporate 
Governance fall short,279 and due to its flexibility via the ‘apply and explain’ principle, 
                                                          
275‘Economic and Corporate Governance’ available at 
http://nepadbusinessfoundation.org/index.php/thematic-areas/economic-and-corporate-
governance (accessed 10th October 2016). 
276 Corrigan T Getting Down to Business: Lessons from the African Peer Review Mechanism (2014) 9. 
277 Which has the added complication of not being enforceable due to the non-functionality of the 
SADC Tribunal.  
278Mallin C Corporate Governance 4th edition (2013) 45.  
279 Such as the duties and rights of stakeholders.  
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which would be highly desirous in this region,280 as well as the emphasis by King IV 
on the inclusive role of stakeholders (both internal and external). Furthermore, as 
mentioned in chapter four, the approach employed by King IV of devising a foundation 
of corporate governance principles together with sector supplements which govern 
specific sectors and their unique challenges is perhaps ideal.  
It is thus submitted that the most suitable option to pursue is the SADC Model Law, 
formulated as espoused above, due to it being perhaps the best fit for the climate 
currently prevalent in the region. It is submitted that the presence of some form of 
uniform corporate governance regime will reap innumerate benefits for the region, not 
least in the pursuit of SADC’s objectives of poverty eradication, economic growth and 
(most importantly) economic integration.  
 
 
 
“We must pull together and work hard in ensuring that SADC succeeds in its 
agenda of development, economic cooperation and regional integration.” 
- Festus Mogae 
Former President of Botswana 
 
 
  
                                                          
280 Particularly owing to SADC member states’ fiercely protective nature described in chapter three.  
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